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TESTING TRANSPARENCY† 
Brigham Daniels, Mark Buntaine & Tanner Bangerter 
ABSTRACT—In modern democracies, governmental transparency is thought 
to have great value. When it comes to addressing administrative corruption 
and mismanagement, many would agree with Justice Brandeis’s observation 
that sunlight is the best disinfectant. Beyond this, many credit transparency 
with enabling meaningful citizen participation. 
But even though transparency appears highly correlated with successful 
governance in developed democracies, assumptions about administrative 
transparency have remained empirically untested. Testing effects of 
transparency would prove particularly helpful in developing democracies 
where transparency norms have not taken hold or only have done so slowly. 
In these contexts, does administrative transparency really create the sorts of 
benefits attributed to it? Transparency might grease the gears of developed 
democracies, but what good is grease when many of the gears seem to be 
broken or missing entirely? 
This Article presents empirical results from a first-of-its-kind field 
study that tested two major promises of administrative transparency in a 
developing democracy: that transparency increases public participation in 
government affairs and that it increases government accountability. To test 
these hypotheses, we used two randomized controlled trials. 
Surprisingly, we found transparency had no significant effect in almost 
any of our quantitative measurements, although our qualitative results 
suggested that when transparency interventions exposed corruption, some 
limited oversight could result. Our findings are particularly significant for 
developing democracies and show, at least in this context, that Justice 
Brandeis may have oversold the cleansing effects of transparency. A few 
rays of transparency shining light on government action do not disinfect the 
system and cure government corruption and mismanagement. Once 
corruption and mismanagement are identified, it takes effective government 
institutions and action from civil society to successfully act as a disinfectant. 
 
 
 † We note with gratitude the research underlying this Article was funded by the National Science 
Foundation, Law and Social Sciences program, joint awards 1655459/1655513. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Brandeis famously wrote that “[s]unlight is said to be the best 
of disinfectants.”1 That quip is immediately recognizable to many and often 
used to justify transparency initiatives.2 But is it correct? What empirical 
evidence do we have that it is? Other important assumptions about 
transparency’s effects also remain untested. Even in the face of a growing 
chorus of transparency skeptics who question the promise of transparency 
and highlight its costs,3 many legal processes are still based on the 
presumption that increased transparency leads to greater citizen participation 
in government decision-making. Can that presumption be supported? We 
find transparency in many successful democratic governments, but 
correlation does not indicate causation. 
 
 1 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
 2 In this piece, we define “transparency” as the act of making information available by the agency or 
organization responsible for that information. This should be distinguished from information disclosure—
a related but distinct phenomenon wherein third-party actors publicize information about government. 
Third-party propagation lacks the imprimatur of government support for disclosure and therefore may be 
expected to affect citizens’ views of the disclosure in different ways. See infra Section II.A. 
 3 See infra Section I.C. 
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In the past half-century, transparency has become a core value among 
modern democracies. The European Parliament incorporated transparency 
among other values in its Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.4 
The Council of Europe included transparency as one of five items on its list 
of “core democratic principles.”5 The United Nations Human Rights Council 
listed “[t]ransparency and accountability in public administration” as one of 
ten “essential elements of democracy.”6 On signing the Freedom of 
Information Act, President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked that “one of our 
most essential principles” is that “democracy works best when the people 
have all the information that the security of the Nation permits.”7 
Transparency has been described as one of the “hallmarks of American 
administrative law,”8 “an emerging international norm,”9 one of the “values 
 
 4 Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, art. 18, 1989 OJ No. C. 120/55 
 5 LAWRENCE PRATCHETT & VIVIEN LOWNDES, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: AN 
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE’S ACQUIS 87–89 (2004). 
 6 Democracy, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/democracy 
[https://perma.cc/SX3U-KURN]; see also UNDP Global Anti-Corruption Initiative (GAIN) 2014–2017, 
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME 9 (2014), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/ 
Democratic%20Governance/Anti-corruption/globalanticorruption_final_web2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MR6Y-ARPE] (discussing the UNDP’s inclusion of transparency and accountability as 
part of its anti-corruption work). 
 7 Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Freedom of Information Act, 
316 PUB. PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966); see also David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the 
Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1787 (2008) (noting 
that FOIA “embodies the ideal that information is the lifeblood of democracy”). 
 8 William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as 
an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 171 (2009); see also B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: 
Two Faces of Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799, 808–09 (2005) (listing 
transparency as one of the “core administrative law principles”); Laura A. Dickinson, Regulating the 
Privatized Security Industry: The Promise of Public/Private Governance, 63 EMORY L.J. 417, 419 (2013) 
(including transparency among the “procedural values of global administrative law”); Miriam Seifter, 
States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953, 992 (2014) (referring to 
transparency as one of the “pillars of the administrative state”); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative 
Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 73 (2005) (listing 
“decisional transparency” as a fundamental structural element of U.S. administrative law). 
 9 Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KAN. L. REV. 
1301, 1307 & n.21 (2006) (citing various proponents of this position); see also Steve Charnovitz, 
Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 927, 928 (2004) 
(discussing the “emergence of international norms on transparency and citizen participation”). 
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of human dignity embedded in human rights and humanitarian law,”10 and 
“essential for democracy to function.”11 
When developing democracies are unwilling to operate with 
transparency, they come under pressure from their own citizenry and from 
developed countries.12 Transparency is quickly becoming an export of 
developed democracies. Some of the most important aid, development, and 
trade organizations promote—and sometimes use their international 
investment power to secure—transparency.13 Perhaps the most effective tool 
 
 10 Dickinson, supra note 8, at 419; see also Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The 
Spread of Liberal Democracy and Its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 7 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (calling the commitment to 
the principles of pluralism, choice, and transparency “essential to securing an institutionalized protection 
of other human rights”); Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 
17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 209 (2006) (listing transparency among the “background values of the global 
governance or human rights movement”); Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and 
Sanitation: History, Meaning, and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 127 
(2013) (listing transparency among “human rights values”). 
 11 Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530. Indeed, “essential” is a 
bit of a shibboleth for descriptions of democracy in the literature. See, e.g., Molly Beutz, Functional 
Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 387, 431 (2003) (describing 
transparency as “essential to the proper functioning of democracy”); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of 
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895–96 (2006) (tracing the modern democratic theory argument 
that transparency is an “essential element of a functional liberal democracy”); see also James R. Hollyer 
et al., Democracy and Transparency, 73 J. POL. 1191, 1192–93 (2011) (noting a consensus among 
scholars that transparency is critical to democratic governance); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in 
Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1349 (calling transparency a useful facilitator of public 
decision-making, which is “an important component of democratic governance”). 
 12 Sometimes the sources of this domestic and international pressure arise from concerted action by 
sophisticated advocates for transparency. Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights 
and Their Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 470 (2014) (discussing 
how transparency advocates “mobilize resources against state structures and officials by working 
simultaneously at two distinct levels: rooting their efforts in specific national contexts . . . while acting 
within transnational networks and furthering seemingly neutral, international norms of transparency”). 
 13 Such organizations include the United Nations, the United States Agency for International 
Development, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and other international institutions, NGOs, 
and businesses. See Democracy, supra note 6 (listing transparency among a handful of values and 
institutions that are “essential elements of democracy”); Promoting Accountability & Transparency, U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (May 7, 2019), https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-
and-governance/promoting-accountability-transparency [https://perma.cc/5ANS-9QHK] (“The process 
of governing is most legitimate when it incorporates democratic principles such as transparency, 
pluralism, citizen involvement in decision-making, representation, and accountability.”); see also Lisa 
Philipps & Miranda Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, Domestic Laws, and the Politics of 
Budgets, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 797, 809–21 (2009) (discussing the role of various international regimes 
and organizations in pushing fiscal transparency); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Sinead Hunt, Transparency 
and Business Advantage: The Impact of International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States 
National Interest, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433, 436–44 (2012) (discussing the evolution of anti-
corruption practices and transparency in U.S. business dealings); Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton 
Sanchez Badin, The World Trade Organization: Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 
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these organizations use to encourage—or even coerce—transparency is 
conditioning foreign investment and development assistance on increased 
transparency.14 
While transparency initiatives have their detractors, most of these 
critics concede the importance of some governmental transparency,15 even 
as they express concern that the costs of transparency may sometimes 
outweigh its benefits.16 Purported costs of transparency include 
 
9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 556, 559–74 (2011) (describing the need for transparency and the measures at work 
within the World Trade Organization); Open Budgets Portal: Tools and Resources, WORLD BANK (2017), 
http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/tools-resources/intl-initiative [https://perma.cc/Z7D7-2XQC] 
(displaying consolidated worldwide budget information to facilitate data visibility and access); Our 
Commitment to Transparency, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.usaid.gov/ 
results-and-data/progress-data/transparency [https://perma.cc/QR3Y-YJ4D] (describing multiple 
transparency initiatives supported by USAID and noting its commitment “to upholding the values of 
transparency, open government, participation, and collaboration in tangible ways that benefit the 
American people”); Together Against Corruption: Transparency International Strategy 2020, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2015), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/ 
together_against_corruption [https://perma.cc/FF9G-H47L] (describing the mission, values, and strategy 
of the global movement to stop corruption and promote transparency). See generally UNDP Global Anti-
Corruption Initiative (GAIN) 2014–2017, supra note 6 (describing initiatives to secure greater 
transparency as a strategy of reducing corruption in the delivery of foreign aid). 
 14 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
REFORM 177–97 (1999) (addressing the role the international community has played in limiting 
corruption when financing development throughout the world); Lisa Philipps & Miranda Stewart, supra 
note 13, at 809–14 (discussing the IMF and other organizations’ role in pushing countries toward fiscal 
transparency through conditional lending); Diane Ring, Developing Countries in an Age of Transparency 
and Disclosure, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1767, 1811–25 (discussing the ways in which international tax 
transparency initiatives may result in higher enforcement rates in developing countries); Richard B. 
Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and 
Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 233–34 (2014) (discussing accountability mechanisms and 
transparency as methods for “generating, constraining, directing, and influencing the exercise of power”); 
Angel Gurría, Openness and Transparency - Pillars for Democracy, Trust and Progress, ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/fr/etatsunis/opennessandtransparencypillarsfordemocracy 
trustandprogress.htm [https://perma.cc/T29S-3HX8] (stating that “[o]penness and transparency are key 
ingredients to build accountability and trust, which are necessary for the functioning of democracies and 
market economies”); Transparency International, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., 
https://en.unesco.org/partnerships/non-governmental-organizations/transparency-international 
[https://perma.cc/KRX2-Q8A9] (describing the methods and objectives behind a transparency initiative 
serving to combat corruption). 
 15 See infra note 23. 
 16 Note that some of transparency’s skeptics are indeed quite skeptical about the value of 
transparency. Of these, perhaps the strongest critique comes from Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
who argue: “‘Mandated disclosure’ may be the most common and least successful regulatory technique 
in American law.” OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 3 (2014). While Ben-Shahar and Schneider take aim at many 
sorts of transparencies, it is interesting that many of the critics of transparency focus on legislative 
transparency, which is different from the administrative transparency at the heart of this paper. See JASON 
GRUMET, CITY OF RIVALS: RESTORING THE GLORIOUS MESS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 85–110 (2014) 
(describing a number of ways that legislative transparency can undermine legislative deal making, 
114:1 (2020) Testing Transparency 
1269 
ossification,17 inefficiency,18 stifled governmental decision making,19 and 
empowering special interests at the expense of broader public interests.20 For 
 
dampen civility and trust among legislators, and drive legislators to avoid doing business in forums where 
transparency is provided). But see GARY D. BASS ET AL., CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT., BROOKINGS 
INST., WHY CRITICS OF TRANSPARENCY ARE WRONG (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/critics.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BBC-5L99]. That said, critiques of legislative 
transparency have similar implications in the administrative context. Although administrative agencies 
do not have the same quantity of critics highlighting the costs of transparency, those costs noted by critics 
of legislative transparency also apply to the administrative context. This is not to say that there are not 
important differences between legislative and administrative transparency, but only that these differences 
relate to practical implementation considerations of potential public reaction to different sorts of 
transparency (e.g., voting against a politician versus attending a public meeting). The distinctions between 
the two types of transparency are less relevant to evaluating the value and costs of transparency generally. 
 17 See Funk, supra note 8, at 182–83 (suggesting too much transparency can leave observations of 
government to narrow interests that can work to defeat broader interests); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. 
Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic 
Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 459–62 (1990) (describing an instance of how 
public transparency created ossification). 
 18 See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE 
L.J. 104, 197–204 (2015) (“Critics . . . worry that the very predictability of enforcement—or, more 
precisely, the predictability of who will be protected from enforcement—will undercut compliance with 
the INA and reduce the deterrent effect of the law, thereby threatening the rule of law.”); Robin Kundis 
Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 30 
(2014) (noting that “administrative law theory has increasingly criticized extensive public participation 
requirements because they create burdensome inefficiency in agency decisionmaking”); Nina A. 
Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1356–71 
(2011) (expanding public input into government decision-making processes through the use of technology 
can result in a deluge of public input, which sometimes can overwhelm or disrupt the process); Schauer, 
supra note 11, at 1352 (“Transparency may well prevent bad officials from engaging in corrupt or 
otherwise bad acts, but . . . transparency can also make it more difficult for good officials to engage in 
good acts.”). 
 19 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Human experience teaches that those 
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances 
and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”); SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON 
THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 171–90 (1982) (arguing among other things that “[t]he 
processes of reasoning, planning, accommodation, and choice are hampered if fully exposed from the 
outset, no matter how great the corresponding dangers of secrecy”); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, 
Earmarking Earmarking, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 249, 294 (2012) (stating that “transparency can famously 
undermine political arrangements”); Funk, supra note 8, at 182 (suggesting too much transparency can 
leave observations of government to narrow interests that can work to defeat broader interests). 
 20 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 16, at 5–7; Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, 
Transparency in the U.S. Budget Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
TO BUDGET POLICY 68, 80 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008) (“[T]he groups that benefit most from 
fishbowl transparency . . . are tightly organized groups seeking transfers to particular economic interests, 
narrowly defined.”); David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1156 (2017) (“FOIA . . . systematically skews the production of information 
toward commercial interests and facilitates powerful antiregulatory agendas.”) [hereinafter Pozen, 
Freedom]; David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 130 (2018) (arguing 
the transparency in the current federal system often tends to empower special interests instead of 
providing oversight for the public interest) [hereinafter Pozen, Transparency]; Antonin Scalia, The 
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example, in a particularly biting criticism of an administrative transparency 
initiative, Justice Scalia went so far as to call the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences” 
and “the Sistine Chapel of Cost Benefit Analysis Ignored.”21 But Justice 
Scalia was unwilling to fully dismiss transparency completely, adding “[t]his 
is not to say that public access to government information has no useful 
role.”22 Following Justice Scalia’s logic, a number of critics—perhaps more 
appropriately labelled as transparency skeptics—argue that what is needed 
is a more thoughtful approach to transparency: where does it make sense and 
what sorts do the most good.23 Similarly, even most of transparency’s 
defenders would concede that although transparency is important, it is not 
preeminent among legal values.24 Most agree that transparency must give 
way in certain situations, and many transparency initiatives explicitly 
accommodate these situations via enumerated exceptions to disclosure 
requirements.25 
Despite these criticisms, institutional commitment to transparency is 
perhaps not surprising. The appeal of transparency is intuitive, particularly 
in contexts where the institutions of government and civil society are strong. 
In these settings, transparency seems to almost effortlessly grease the 
 
Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG., Mar./Apr. 1982, at 16 (arguing FOIA was passed to 
protect “the little guy” but is mainly useful to “corporate lawyers”). 
 21 Scalia, supra note 20, at 15. 
 22 Id. at 19. 
 23 See e.g., Fenster, supra note 11, at 910–11 (“[P]roponents and skeptics disagree about the 
normative and practical effects of disclosure requirements—effects that they feel certain would occur—
but they agree both that transparency is better than its opposite in the abstract, and that they can derive 
and impose the measure of transparency that democracy requires.”); Scalia, supra note 20, at 19; 
Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/against-transparency [https://perma.cc/H528-48ZR] 
(“How could anyone be against transparency? Its virtues and its utilities seem so crushingly obvious. But 
I have increasingly come to worry that there is an error at the core of this unquestioned goodness. We are 
not thinking critically enough about where and when transparency works, and where and when it may 
lead to confusion, or to worse.”). 
 24 Almost all of those involved in the debate about the merits of transparency converge on the point 
that at least some degree of transparency is necessary. Perhaps because of this, Professor Mark Fenster 
aptly labels skeptics of transparency “weak-form” transparency advocates. Fenster, supra note 11, at 910–
11. 
 25 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1)–(7) (2012) (including exemptions for, among other things, military 
matters, national security, and law enforcement); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 n.6 (1973) (“Success lies 
in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places 
emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965))); see also 
Fenster, supra note 11, at 912–14 (discussing the balance of interests that FOIA’s statutory exemptions 
attempts to create); Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine 
in the 1990’s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1172–73 (1993) 
(summarizing statutory exceptions to state open meetings requirements). 
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machinery of democracy. For example, new information might galvanize 
interest groups and spur new investigative media series. Both will, in turn, 
sift through what might be mountains of information and publicize only its 
most salient aspects, which may be accompanied by specific calls to action. 
When mismanagement is uncovered, calls for political oversight follow, and 
politicians may provide such oversight without much prompting as they seek 
to enhance their reputations and grow their electoral support. When 
corruption is found, the public demands increased political oversight, and in 
response, government leaders push for investigations and public hearings, 
and police and prosecutors may even begin criminal investigations. 
In developing democracies where transparency has not fully taken hold, 
some suggest that lack of transparency is both the cause and effect of 
corruption.26 A lack of transparency conceals malignant actors and 
minimizes political accountability. However, there may be less nefarious 
explanations: for instance, skepticism of transparency’s lofty promises may 
carry more weight in developing nations. Developing nations may question 
whether transparency initiatives are worth the costs, given all the other 
economic and social stresses present in most developing democracies. If 
transparency reduces efficiency and increases the cost of government in a 
country grappling with widespread hunger, disease, and little access to 
education or reliable infrastructure, then investing in transparency might not 
seem worth it. There is no certainty that if transparency exposed problems in 
the government, the government would work to address such problems. 
Leaders, politicians, prosecutors, police agencies, and courts would need to 
address the problems transparency uncovered—none of which would be 
guaranteed in a state with fragile and sometimes corrupt institutions. 
 
 26 One way to see the tricky causal and correlative links between transparency and corruption play 
out is through examining the various Country Reports on Human Rights Practices complied by the State 
Department. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2017: MONGOLIA (“Factors contributing to corruption included 
conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, lack of access to information, an inadequate civil service 
system, and weak government control of key institutions.”), with U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2015: LIBYA (“There 
were many reports and accusations of government corruption due to lack of transparency in the 
government’s management of security forces, oil revenues, and the national economy.”), U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
2016: BURUNDI (“There were also allegations of corruption related to lack of transparency of budget 
revenue related to gasoline importation.”), and U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. 
AND LAB., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2013: GUINEA-BISSAU (“No progress was 
made during the year toward reducing corruption and increasing transparency. Corruption was endemic, 
and the government efforts were limited to combat the problem.”). 
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All this leads to a crucial question: if the standard assumptions about 
how transparency motivates nongovernmental actors do not hold true in 
developing democracies, can investments in transparency be justified? 
Without robust institutions and civil society, the risks of corruption and 
mismanagement that could be exposed by greater transparency are higher—
but so are the potential welfare trade-offs involved in allocating resources 
between transparency initiatives and other development programs. In 
evaluating the costs and benefits of transparency in developing democracies, 
intuition can only take us so far. Empirical evidence is vital to help us 
understand the reach and effect of transparency initiatives. But until now, at 
least in the administrative context, no causal empirical evidence existed 
relating to transparency initiatives.27 
In this Article, we report our efforts to empirically test two hypotheses 
about administrative transparency in the context of a developing democracy. 
This study emerges from an incredibly rare opportunity to conduct 
randomized controlled trials on transparency’s effects in the administrative 
setting.28 
Our research not only required finding a government agency willing to 
introduce a new degree of transparency but also the willingness of that 
government to make the new transparency available on a randomized basis.29 
It is important to note the difference between information disclosure as 
opposed to transparency. A test of transparency entails not only the effect of 
 
 27 See infra Section I.A.2 (discussing causal evidence derived from randomized control trials in the 
administrative context, all of which focus on information disclosure by third parties rather than 
government-introduced administrative transparency.) 
 28 See infra Section II.B.1. 
 29 In order to tease out causal relationships of transparency—not just correlation—we needed an 
opportunity to measure the difference between the base case (i.e., a control) and the test case where 
transparency is offered (i.e., a treatment). Given the difficulty of teasing out the potential differences 
between cases in one place from another or one time from another, the easiest way to find a base case and 
test case was through randomizing the application of transparency. In the context of our study, that meant 
finding a case where people and communities could be randomly assigned to different degrees of 
administrative transparency. 
 The opportunity to test transparency in this context is incredibly rare. In many developed democracies, 
transparency is already ubiquitous, so running a test would require dialing transparency back. An effective 
test case would require that some groups continue to receive transparency (i.e., the control) while others 
are deprived of it (i.e., the treatment). In a practical sense, such a proposal is almost laughable. On the 
other hand, in developing democracies that have not provided transparency, most governments are not 
willing to simply begin providing transparency. Tinkering with transparency levels does not happen 
without careful consideration, as government leaders may perceive transparency’s effects as more of a 
threat than a boon. Furthermore, even if a government were willing to provide more transparency, it 
would also need to be willing to cooperate with researchers to provide transparency to some citizens but 
not others on a randomized basis. In order to fully test a hypothesis on transparency’s effects, all these 
stars (among others) must align. 
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disclosing information about the government but also the impact of such 
disclosures by the government. 
Fortunately, we found a willing government partner in a collaborative 
research project we performed with the management of a development 
program in Uganda’s Bwindi Impenetrable Forest National Park (“the 
Park”).30 The Park worked with us to disclose information essential to 
providing increased oversight over community development projects in 
some villages surrounding the Park while not doing the same in other 
villages. We rolled out two randomized control studies, one that focused on 
the effect of increased transparency on community participation and a second 
that focused on public accountability. 
These efforts resulted in a substantial trove of data.31 Our first 
randomized controlled trial focused on testing whether sharing information 
about public meetings—such as when and where the meetings took place, as 
well as their purpose and stakes—would affect resident participation.32 Our 
results show this transparency treatment not only failed to produce increased 
participation but also, surprisingly, resulted in residents reporting that they 
felt less able to participate in those meetings.33 As we dug into the data and 
followed up with qualitative interviews, we found that transparency 
backfired particularly strongly among women and other disadvantaged 
groups. It seemed that the messages reinforced their perception that they 
could not overcome local elites and would not benefit from participating.34 
The second randomized controlled trial—focusing on whether 
transparency resulted in increased accountability in the delivery of local 
development projects—again indicated that transparency initiatives fell short 
of their promise.35 In this trial, residents in some villages received regular 
 
 30 The Bwindi Impenetrable Forest National Park is renowned because it is one of the two areas on 
the planet where mountain gorillas are found. 
 31 In this Article, we present certain findings for the first time and recontextualize findings from two 
of our previous peer-reviewed social science papers in a legal context. Mark T. Buntaine et al., Can 
Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven Development? A Field Experiment 
near Bwindi National Park, Uganda, 106 WORLD DEV. 407, 408 (2018); Mark T. Buntaine & Brigham 
Daniels, Diffuse Responsibility Undermines Public Oversight: A Field Experiment at Bwindi National 
Park, Uganda (Mar. 22, 2019) (working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3371189 
[https://perma.cc/XB5C-T6S8]. While we feel somewhat sheepish about continually footnoting our past 
work in the Parts that follow, we do this so the reader can understand what we have reported elsewhere 
and what we have not. 
 32 Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development?, supra note 31, at 408. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 Buntaine & Daniels, Diffuse Responsibility Undermines Public Oversight, supra note 31, at 26. 
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reminders about the allocation of funds for a village-level project, 
information that was not easily available from any other source. However, 
follow-up qualitative work illustrated how transparency gave residents a 
foothold to seek other forms of accountability beyond project delivery. For 
example, one corrupt official was fired, another was suspended and then 
reassigned, and a corrupt contractor fled the area in an attempt to escape the 
consequences of a government investigation.36 These results indicate that, 
even though we were not able to find statistically significant impacts of 
transparency treatments on the delivery of local development projects, 
transparency did work in some communities to highlight problems, inspire 
action, and promote at least some accountability in specific cases.37 
In reflecting on our results, we conclude that promoters of transparency 
should not oversell its promises, particularly in areas where the institutions 
of civil society and the administrative state are weak. Based on these results, 
we advocate for careful implementation of transparency initiatives to ensure 
they do not further deflate and alienate those with little influence in society. 
At the same time, we argue that transparency should not be abandoned as a 
means to promote broader participation and involvement in government. 
Transparency can impact society in a number of positive ways, even though 
its effects may be difficult to capture quantitatively. We also suspect that the 
benefits of transparency may take time to materialize. It is entirely possible 
that, although transparency does not immediately result in better 
government, highlighting problems may still improve governance in the long 
run. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, we define transparency 
and provide further background on the emergence of administrative 
transparency initiatives in developed and developing democracies. Part II 
develops the two major assumptions about transparency that we put forward 
as testable hypotheses: that increased governmental transparency leads to 
increased public participation and that increased governmental transparency 
increases public accountability. Part III discusses our research design for 
testing the impact of transparency. Part IV discusses the results of the two 
randomized controlled trials that we employed to test these hypotheses. 
Finally, Part V describes how our research changed the way we think about 
transparency and highlights a few of the questions our results raise for 
transparency initiatives, especially in developing democracies. 
 
 36 Id. at 27–30. 
 37 Id. at 4. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This Part provides the relevant background on transparency and the 
history of our experiment. First, we provide a definition of transparency and 
contrast it with information disclosure. We discuss why so little empirical 
evidence relates to transparency and focuses instead on information 
disclosure. Second, this Part considers how transparency came late in the 
historical arc of most developed democracies and contrasts this to today’s 
developing countries, which often attempt to introduce transparency much 
earlier in the development of political institutions. We provide a potential 
explanation of why a democracy’s stage of development might significantly 
impact—for better or for worse—the success of transparency initiatives. 
Finally, we review some of the major contentions of transparency skeptics. 
This growing body of work critiques the widely held assumptions in favor 
of administrative transparency, providing additional motivation to put 
transparency to the test. 
A. Transparency Versus Information Disclosure 
1. Defining Administrative Transparency 
Transparency has been described as “availability and accessibility of 
knowledge and information,”38 “openness to the gaze of others,”39 being able 
to see how “business is conducted,”40 “the degree to which information . . . 
is made publicly available,”41 “knowledge about government actors and 
decisions and access to government information,”42 and “the process of 
making the invisible or hidden visible or seen.”43 Though their prominence 
varies, two key elements to all these definitions are that transparency 
encompasses both information and the act of making information available. 
In most usages, the making available aspect requires that the entity that 
possesses potentially hidden information be the one to reveal it. 
 
 38 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 135–53 (1995). 
 39 Fenster, supra note 11, at 888. 
 40 Salvador J. Esparza & Michael L. Wall, Transparency: Everyone Is Watching!, in NEW 
LEADERSHIP FOR TODAY’S HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 292 (Louis G. Rubino et al. eds., 2d ed. 2020). 
 41 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, TECH. COMM., TRANSPARENCY ON SECONDARY MARKETS: A 
SYNTHESIS OF THE IOSCO DEBATE 23 (1992). 
 42 J.M. Balkin, How Mass Media Simulate Political Transparency, 3 CULTURAL VALUES 393, 393 
(1999). 
 43 Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal 
Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 458 (2014). 
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This Article focuses on administrative transparency, meaning 
transparency relating to the workings of government agencies. Most field 
studies on government disclosure do not focus on the workings of agencies, 
but rather on the behavior of citizens and how their voting behavior changes 
in elections as a result of information disclosure. But a hacker’s revelation 
of information found in a government agency’s files would not render the 
agency itself transparent, even if the hacker was motivated by a belief in the 
importance of governmental transparency.44 Positive action by an agency to 
make information available implies an intent to conduct the business of 
government in ways that are visible to citizens. This distinction—between 
intentional and unintentional disclosure—may affect the way the disclosed 
information, and the agency itself, are perceived by citizens. 
2. Empirical Testing of Transparency and Information Disclosure 
Most of what we know about the impact of government information on 
society comes from empirical research on the impact of informational 
disclosure, not transparency. But third-party disclosure does not imply an 
intent to conduct the business of government in an open and accessible 
manner. Nongovernment actors (generally researchers, NGOs, or the media) 
have tested the impact of disclosing to the public government information on 
numerous occasions. These actors publicize information they generate 
themselves or information that a government has released but that is mostly 
or entirely unknown to the general public. While these information 
disclosures seem superficially similar to transparency, the two are not 
interchangeable. Administrative transparency connotes more than just the 
presence of government information; it also implies a willingness of the 
government to release that information and to make private information 
public. This distinction is not mere semantics. In measuring the impact of 
information disclosure on government corruption and governance, 
participation in governmental processes, or the public’s perception of and 
trust in the government, it matters whether the government disclosed the 
information itself. The imposition of information disclosure on the 
government by third parties does not suggest to citizens that the government 
is inviting scrutiny, participation, and trust. Transparency arguably does, at 
least on the margins. 
If government disclosure is substantively different from disclosure by 
third parties, it is clear why testing the transparency hypotheses is so 
difficult: government cooperation is necessary. Governments rarely have the 
 
 44 The act of making available by the entity that could keep information secret is what led Fenster to 
rightly label information published by Wikileaks as informational disclosure instead of transparency. 
Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753, 781–807 (2012). 
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opportunity to roll out new transparency initiatives, and even when they do, 
they rarely have the flexibility—or even the willingness—to do so using a 
randomized process that would permit a study of the effects of administrative 
transparency. The willingness of a government to randomize transparency 
allows researchers to test not only the effect of disclosing information about 
the government but to test the impact of transparency by the government. 
B. Emergence of Transparency in the Arc of Democracies 
In this Section, we provide context on transparency initiatives in 
developing countries—why we are seeing more of them and how we might 
think about them normatively. To do this, we provide a brief overview of the 
role transparency has played in developed democracies and when 
transparency established itself as an important value in the arc of their 
development.45 We then contrast that history to the transparency initiatives 
that have become increasingly common in developing democracies. This 
discussion allows us to speculate about the usefulness of transparency 
initiatives at an early stage of political and economic development. 
1. The Emergence of Transparency in Developed Democracies 
Robust transparency generally comes quite late in democracies’ 
developmental process. In the United States, for example, the common law 
was intact before the thirteen colonies declared their independence from 
England.46 Principles of separation of powers and popular representation 
were enshrined by the 1787 Constitution.47 Adoption of the Bill of Rights 
explicitly guaranteed key civic freedoms like freedom of speech and the right 
to trial by jury.48 
Early in its history, the United States experienced a tremendous growth 
in its institutions of civil society. The French sociologist Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who studied the development of the United States at the turn of 
the nineteenth century, remarked on what we would likely see today as an 
explosive growth in civil society: 
 
 45 For a much more robust and rich discussion of history of transparency, see Pozen, Transparency, 
supra note 20, at 107–44, for a discussion of the shift from a progressive to a more libertarian type of 
transparency in the United States. 
 46 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 90–93 (2d ed., 1985) (discussing 
the common law—and codification of it—in the U.S. colonial period). 
 47 For separation of powers principles, see, for example, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 and id. art. II, § 2. 
For popular sovereignty principles, see, for example, U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. I, § 2; and id. amends. 
XV, XVII, XIX, XIV, XVI.  
 48 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 1–136 (1998) 
(providing a history of the Bill of Rights and explaining the freedoms it guarantees). 
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The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, 
to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the 
antipodes; they found in this manner hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it be 
proposed to inculcate some truth, or to foster some feeling, by the 
encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever, at the head 
of some new undertaking, you see the government in France, or a man of rank 
in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association.49 
The institutions of civil society that de Tocqueville found so remarkable and 
firmly rooted in the early 1800s provided a foundation for these institutions 
to build on. 
Over time, the government institutions and civil society grew in 
sophistication and reach. State and local governments—some of which had 
roots preceding independence—led the way in the early days of the Republic. 
The federal government’s growth came in energetic spurts. In the 1880s, 
Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission, which in many 
ways grew into the first modern administrative agency—one staffed by 
experts who would exert influence through the creation of regulation.50 
The twentieth century began with wide-ranging progressive reforms 
that frequently expanded the reach of government.51 Interestingly, 
information disclosure became one of the tools to promote the changes urged 
by progressives. For example, the legislation to rein in the food and drug 
industries required not only government inspections but mandatory public 
disclosure of the findings, heightening the impact of oversight.52 Likewise, 
Congress’s passage of the nation’s first federal whistleblower protections 
helped promote the public disclosure of information on the operations of 
 
 49 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 129–30 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry Reeve 
trans., 1863). 
 50 Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 n.100 
(1983); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1208–15 
(1986) (discussing the formation and development of the Interstate Commerce Commission). 
 51 Rabin, supra note 50, at 1218 n.74 (“Historians have had great difficulty identifying a Progressive 
‘movement,’ and with good reason. The diffuse character of ‘Progressive’ reforms is striking: Local 
reforms aimed at eliminating ‘machine’ politics and democratizing the electoral process; state-level 
reforms intended to regulate factory wages, hours and accident compensation; federal reforms in the food 
and drug area have all been lumped together as goals of the ‘Progressive movement,’ despite 
overwhelming evidence that key participants in the respective policymaking processes shared virtually 
no sense of common purpose.”). 
 52 Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1256 (1907) (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. 
§ 601 et seq.); Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938); see 
also LEWIS L. GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1914, at 27 (2001) (discussing 
Roosevelt’s efforts to use “publicity about the operations” as a way “to insure their socially beneficial 
behavior”); Kevin Stoker & Brad L. Rawlins, The “Light” of Publicity in the Progressive Era: From 
Searchlight to Flashlight, 30 JOURNALISM HIST. 177 (2005). 
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government.53 It is perhaps not surprising that it was during this period that 
Justice Brandeis compared transparency to sunlight.54 
In the wake of the Great Depression, the New Deal further expanded 
the reach of government.55 In the post-World War II period, efforts were 
made to rationalize and check the workings of government. The clearest 
reflection of this is in the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).56 Nonetheless, the federal government continued to expand during 
the 1950s and 1960s.57 This period also saw the enactment of the first 
Freedom of Information Act,58 though in a much weaker form than the 
enactment that we have today.59 
Following Watergate, a period that featured a President actively 
fighting disclosure of information that had the potential to implicate him and 
his own administration in wrongdoing,60 we saw additional transparency 
legislation enacted. This included a significant strengthening and expansion 
of the federal Freedom of Information Act,61 which assumed something close 
to its current form. This enactment resulted in a “strong presumption” of 
 
 53 Lloyd–La Follette Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7211). 
 54 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 55 Rabin, supra note 50, at 1243–53 (discussing evolution of the regulatory state during the New 
Deal); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New 
Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561–65 (1996) (summarizing the administrative history of the 
New Deal); Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United 
States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 84–85 (2012) (discussing transparency reforms during the New 
Deal). 
 56 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946); see also CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURRAY, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 14:21 (3d ed. 2010), Westlaw ADMLP § 14:21 (“Efforts to 
improve transparency in the federal government took on a new urgency in the middle of the 20th century. 
In the 1960s, trust in the government reached new lows. The Freedom of Information Act was one of the 
responses to this public attitude.”); Shepherd, supra note 55, at 1558–61 (summarizing the history that 
resulted in the APA); Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 84–87 (summarizing how notice and comment 
rulemaking along with other provisions of the APA resulted in dramatic increases in government 
transparency). 
 57 JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE 
NEW DEAL 195–202 (2012). 
 58 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966). 
 59 Scalia, supra note 20, at 14, 15 (“The 1966 version was a relatively toothless beast, sometimes 
kicked about shamelessly by the agencies.”). 
 60 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700–02 (1974) (holding that Nixon would need to hand 
over the tapes he surreptitiously recorded of his conversations with his advisors and visitors to the White 
House to the Watergate special prosecutor). 
 61 Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 
AMENDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, S. REP. NO. 93-854 (1974). 
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disclosure of documents held by the government.62 This period also saw the 
passage of open meetings requirements as part of the Government in the 
Sunshine Act.63 In this context, Chief Justice Earl Warren reflected the mood 
of the times: “If anything is to be learned from our present difficulties, 
compendiously known as Watergate, it is that we must open our public 
affairs to public scrutiny on every level of government.”64 
Most European Union member states, which include many developed 
democracies, took even longer to embrace transparency. While Sweden’s 
transparency laws predate the founding of the United States,65 it was only in 
the 1990s that most European countries began to move toward robust 
transparency regimes. Even then, the movement began primarily with 
countries in Scandinavia.66 However, this patchwork approach became much 
less significant in 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force within 
EU countries.67 Among other reforms, the Treaty calls for government 
decision-making to occur in the public eye within the EU. This often takes 
the form of providing public access to government documents. EU 
regulations attempt to practically implement the Treaty’s lofty ideal of 
government openness.68 The regulation starts from the premise that “[a]ll 
documents held by the European Parliament, Council and Commission are 
public.”69 While there are some exemptions to the requirement that 
administrative documents should be open to the public, these exceptions are 
interpreted narrowly.70 The right of EU residents to access documents has 
been extended across all public entities in the EU.71 While some EU member 
 
 62 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991); Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 88; see also 
Vladeck, supra note 7, at 1796. 
 63 Michael Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open 
Government Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1007, 1017, 1018 n.63 (2015). 
 64 Earl Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally, 60 AM. B. ASS’N J. 550, 550 (1974). 
 65 Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests, 
11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 293–94 (2005); Jacques Ziller, European Models of Government: Towards a 
Patchwork with Missing Pieces, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 102, 105, 108 (2001) (contrasting the Swedish 
system of open government with the closed systems of other countries). 
 66 Bignami, supra note 65, at 293–94. 
 67 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
 68 Council Regulation No. 1049/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 (EC). 
 69 European Union Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Dep’t for Citizens’ Rights & 
Constitutional Affairs, Openness, Transparency, and the Right of Access to Documents in the EU, at 4 
(2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/556973/IPOL_IDA(2016)556973_ 
EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2AL-PSZ9]. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 15(3), May 9, 
2008 O.J. (C 115) 54. 
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states struggle to live up to these commitments, among the most developed 
countries in the European Union, we see significant transparency. 
Similar stories of commitments to transparency could be told about 
other developed countries that embraced transparency late in their 
evolutionary processes, such as Japan,72 Australia,73 Canada,74 New 
Zealand,75 and South Korea.76 Different transparency initiatives, of course, 
can require various degrees of transparency and apply to a variety of settings. 
Developed democracies continue to adopt different degrees of transparency 
on fundamental aspects of governance, seeking to facilitate meaningful 
citizen oversight and participation. 
2. Transparency Initiatives in Developing Democracies 
Despite the late adoption of transparency in most developed 
democracies, advocates both internal and external encourage today’s 
developing democracies to implement transparency initiatives early—even 
when other aspects of democratic infrastructure are still relatively weak. For 
example, during the last decade, even as Mexico’s government, then under 
Enrique Peña Nieto, was “accused of authoritarianism and corruption”—
both barometers of a struggling democracy—elements of “[c]ivil society, 
social movements, investigative journalists, and normal citizens aided by 
social media” pushed for the expansion of transparency within Mexico, 
while the Mexican government sought to co-opt and water down any 
transparency gains.77 Similar stories could be told about transparency 
 
 72 Michael J. Marcus, Regulatory Transparency in Japan: Half Full or Half Empty?, 3 ASIA PERSP. 
20 (2001); T.J. Pempel, Japanese Bureaucratic Transparency, POLICY BRIEF 2012-4 (2012), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265241657_Japanese_Bureaucratic_Transparency 
[https://perma.cc/ZDZ5-RY6R]. 
 73 Mary Anne Neilsen, Public Sector Accountability and Transparency, in AUSTL. PARLIAMENTARY 
LIBRARY BRIEFING BOOK (Sept. 2010), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ 
Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook43p/publicsectoraccountability 
[https://perma.cc/VX3S-73S8]. 
 74 Transparency, GOV’T OF CAN. (last updated Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/ 
employment-social-development/corporate/transparency.html [https://perma.cc/X69H-4FWA]. 
 75 E. Allan Lind, Transparency, Trust and Public Value, in OPENING GOVERNMENT: TRANSPARENCY 
AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE 87, 87 (John Wanna & Sam Vincent eds. 2018); 
Declaration on Open and Transparent Government, N.Z. GOV’T (last updated Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.data.govt.nz/manage-data/policies/declaration-on-open-and-transparent-government 
[https://perma.cc/DN5A-ELRC]. 
 76 Hyehyun Hong, The Internet, Transparency, and Government–Public Relationships in Seoul, 
South Korea, 40 PUB. REL. REV. 500 (2014); Mark Funkhouser, South Korea’s Street-Level 
Transparency, GOVERNING (May 2014), http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/on-leadership/gov-
street-level-transparency.html [https://perma.cc/W2CJ-D9J6]. 
 77 Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, Rethinking Accountability and Transparency: Breaking the Public 
Sector Bias in Mexico, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 427–37 (2014). 
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advocates supporting initiatives in countries like India,78 South Africa,79 and 
Ghana,80 among others. 
At the same time, international institutions and organizations such as 
the United Nations, United States Agency for International Development, 
the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank have strongly supported 
the adoption of transparency measures in developing countries.81 These 
outside organizations pressure developing democracies to embrace 
transparency—in some cases by making foreign aid and investment 
contingent on the adoption of specific transparency measures.82 
But why, among the various tools available to promote better 
governance, is transparency so often a priority? Perhaps the answer is that, 
unlike other key features of thriving democracies, transparency mandates are 
almost uniquely exportable. Decades of work may be necessary to develop 
an educated population, a robust press, a judiciary that respects individual 
rights and the rule of law, a meaningful system of checks and balances, or an 
active civil society movement. Yet, when things change, they can change 
quickly: transparency initiatives can be implemented within the term of a 
single political administration, if the political will exists to do so. 
While there is hope that transparency will pay dividends in developing 
democracies and that it will push these countries along their pathway toward 
political and economic development, at this point, the hope is just that—a 
hope. And, though much rides on this hope, it is uncertain whether 
transparency initiatives will do much good in developing democracies. 
Given this uncertainty, empirical testing of transparency—as described in 
Parts II and III—becomes all the more important. 
C. The Skeptic’s Response to Transparency Promotion 
In recent years, a new body of work has challenged transparency 
proponents to rethink what sorts of transparency are worth the costs, when 
transparency is appropriate, and what level of voluntary disclosure is 
beneficial. Below, we provide a brief introduction to the literature 
 
 78 See C. Raj Kumar, Corruption, Development and Good Governance: Challenges for Promoting 
Access to Justice in Asia, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 475, 524 (2008) (noting that India recognized the right 
to information to promote corruption-free governmental service). 
 79 See Phillips & Stewart, supra note 13, at 815–18 (noting that the International Budget Project 
surveyed South Africa regarding budget transparency). 
 80 Eyram A. Adadevoh, New Wine in New Wine Skins: The Anti-Corruption Framework of Ghana, 
7 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 202, 205–12 (2014) (noting that Ghana passed a Right to Information Bill 
to promote transparency in 2013). 
 81 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 82 See id. 
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questioning the implementation and value of modern transparency 
initiatives. 
One line of criticism focuses on the ways that transparency favors 
societal elites, at the cost of society in general or of the disadvantaged in 
particular.83 The case for administrative transparency assumes that 
information released by the government becomes open to the public. 
However, those with niche but strongly held interests (e.g., a profit motive) 
are more likely to go through the effort to access and act on disclosed 
information. 
Another critique is that while some level of transparency might prove 
helpful to the public in an absolute sense, the costs of transparency may 
ultimately outstrip its benefits.84 While the financial cost of compliance with 
transparency initiatives can be significant, other nonfiscal costs may be 
incurred as well. For example, transparency could chill internal 
deliberations, reduce candor, increase posturing, reduce flexibility, and limit 
the ability of government agencies (and leaders) to evolve in their thinking.85 
 
 83 See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 275 (1990) (claiming open 
meetings laws provide access to lobbyists and “serve to increase the powers of special interests, not to 
diminish them”); Pozen, Transparency, supra note 20, at 124–25 (explaining that while public groups 
were the first to rely on FOIA, “[p]rofit-motivated enterprises, however, soon came to dominate the 
requester pool”); see also Pozen, Freedom, supra note 20, at 1112 (arguing that “businesses are [FOIA’s] 
principal patrons”); Amy E. Rees, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: A 
“Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both,” 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1184 (1995) (“In fact, FOIA 
has rarely if ever been used as a powerful external check on governmental affairs. Rather, the typical 
FOIA request is made by a wily civil litigant circumventing traditional discovery rules, a corporate 
counsel in search of competitors’ financial information . . . .”). 
 84 David Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a Difference? The Example of the European Council 
of Ministers, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 165, 165–66 (Christopher Hood & 
David Heald eds., 2006) (discussing costs of transparency in international relations); Jacob E. Gersen & 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185 (2014) (describing the potential 
for accountability measures to backfire in representative government, by creating incentives for 
representatives to make suboptimal choices that they anticipate will be viewed favorably); Andrew Keane 
Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1, 25–38 (2018) (detailing various costs associated 
with transparency); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 275 (2010) (discussing arguments 
in favor of governmental secrecy in a variety of contexts and theoretical frameworks); Pozen, 
Transparency, supra note 20, at 158–59. 
 85 Fenster, supra note 11, at 908 (“Transparency also harms government decisionmaking by 
adversely affecting the ability of government officials to deliberate over policy matters outside of the 
public eye, and by curbing or skewing the production of informational goods. Disclosure of documents 
prepared by government officials may inhibit a president and agency decisionmakers from receiving 
candid, objective, and knowledgeable advice from subordinates.”); see also United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of 
their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process.”); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If 
presidential advisers must assume they will be held to account publicly for all approaches that were 
advanced, considered but ultimately rejected, they will almost inevitably be inclined to avoid serious 
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While transparency proponents might hope to increase trust in 
government, some critics suggest that the opposite may occur. Providing the 
public full information about how the government works may, 
counterintuitively, undermine public trust in government. At some level, the 
public is frequently disappointed to find out how exactly the metaphorical 
sausage of government is actually made.86 
Another critique is less prominent in the literature but may be especially 
helpful in explaining the results of our experiment. There is a branch of 
literature focused on the specific context of developing democracies that, 
without questioning whether increased transparency is desirable to some 
degree, questions whether transparency alone is sufficient to help improve 
governance. These critics suggest that transparency in isolation cannot make 
substantial headway given the interconnected and endemic governance 
failures with which many developing democracies struggle.87 
 
consideration of novel or controversial approaches to presidential problems.”); Simone Chambers, Behind 
Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 389 (2004) 
(“[T]he ‘glare’ of publicity makes it difficult to argue reasonably.”); Andrea Prat, The Wrong Kind of 
Transparency, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 862 (2005) (detailing a general theory of the ways that transparency 
might work to demotivate agents in a principal-agent game). 
 86 R. Michael Alvarez et al., Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are Counted?, 70 J. POL. 754, 
764 (2008) (highlighting a negative relationship between voter familiarity with voting technology and 
confidence in elections). 
 87 Arie Halachmi & Dorothea Greiling, Transparency, E-Government, and Accountability, 36 PUB. 
PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 562, 566 (2013) (“Yet it should be noted that transparency is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for ensuring greater public accountability.”); Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, Is 
Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries?, 37 WORLD DEV. 521, 521 
(2009) (“The main conclusions of the paper are that though transparency may affect corruption in several 
ways, it is insufficient in itself, and needs to be complemented by other types of reforms.”); id. at 524 
(“Several studies argue, however, that the effect of transparency on corruption is not unconditional. In 
other words, transparency is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to reduce corruption. In addition to 
access to information, you need an ability to process the information, and the ability and incentives to act 
on the processed information.”); Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin, Transparency Is Not Enough: 
Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption, 31 INTL. POL. SCI. REV. 301, 303 (2010) 
(“Transparency is no quick fix. In order to do its job with respect to corruption it is dependent on other 
factors, which may take a long time to improve.”); George M. von Furstenberg, Hopes and Delusions of 
Transparency, 12 N. AM. J. ECON. & FIN. 105, 114 (2001) (“This belief, either based on naïveté or cynical 
pretense, in the revolutionary power of transparency is entirely misplaced in countries with corrupt, 
dictatorial, or simply vicious rulers whose subjects cannot act on information about their oppressors no 
matter how clear and transparent their crimes. Calling for greater transparency of a government 
sufficiently tyrannical to prevent the people from using information about it would not change anything; 
it could not empower an effective opposition. Greater transparency thus may or may not be necessary, 
but it certainly is not sufficient for reform.”). 
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II. THE TRANSPARENCY HYPOTHESES 
In this Part, we lay out two hypotheses tested by our experiment: that 
administrative transparency increases public participation and that it 
increases government accountability.88 We provide both theoretical and 
empirical background information about both hypotheses to explain why 
transparency might be expected to affect each outcome. We should note that 
both hypotheses have been subjected to only limited or indirect empirical 
testing, motivating our experiment further. Below, we also review prior 
empirical testing of information disclosure by third parties and relate it to 
what is asserted about administrative transparency. 
A. The Public Participation Hypothesis 
Increased administrative transparency is expected to mobilize the 
public. Many scholars and jurists have argued that transparency allows for 
observation, and observation informs the need for action and increases its 
efficacy.89 This public participation hypothesis is not a new concept—James 
Madison argued that “a people who mean to be their own Governors, must 
 
 88 While many scholars see interrelationships among transparency, participation, and accountability, 
a number of scholars have explicitly asserted a causal relationship between transparency on one hand and 
accountability and participation on the other. See, e.g., Carl E. Bruch & Roman Czebiniak, Globalizing 
Environmental Governance: Making the Leap from Regional Initiatives on Transparency, Participation, 
and Accountability in Environmental Matters, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10428 (2002); Elizabeth Figueroa, 
Transparency in Administrative Courts: From the Outside Looking In, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUDICIARY 
1, 7 (2015) (“[T]ransparency is consistent with the general principle that public officials and civil servants 
have a duty to act visibly, predictably and understandably to promote participation and accountability.”). 
 89 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (“The basic purpose of FOIA is 
to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against 
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM 
T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 581 (3d ed. 2014) (“Open government is in accord with our basic 
principles of democracy and the need for citizens to know how their government, in fact, functions. This 
enables the citizenry to make proper evaluations of the wisdom of governmental uses of power.”); ERNEST 
GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: IN A NUTSHELL 153 (5th ed. 
2006) (“Effective public and political oversight requires detailed knowledge of agency activities; and 
without disclosure of records in the government’s possession, citizens may be unable to determine 
whether the agency is ignoring violations of law.”); Thomas O. Sargentich, Debates About Openness in 
Government: Freedom of Information, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANTHOLOGY 209 (Thomas O. 
Sargentich ed., 1994) (“On the other hand, the public often demands more openness on the part of the 
government, especially agencies. After all, learning what is happening in agencies is an important first 
step in developing strategies of response. Also, democratic theory requires a high degree of public 
knowledge about the workings of government so that the desired processes of dialogue and interaction 
can occur.”); Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 399, 399 (2009) (“Our political institutions cannot function properly without [sunlight].”); 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001) (stating that 
“presidential leadership enhances transparency, enabling the public to comprehend more accurately the 
sources and nature of bureaucratic power”). 
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arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”90 Administrative 
transparency provides information that helps answer the who, what, when, 
where, why, and how of participation in government policies, programs, and 
decision-making. At a societal level, information can create shared 
knowledge and thereby reduce collective-action costs to mobilize the 
public.91 Without transparency, knowledge is diminished, and ignorance 
works to prevent individual and collective action, facilitating corruption.92 
However, a number of scholars have questioned whether transparency 
actually mobilizes the public. For example, some argue that transparency 
does not translate into public knowledge and action, just knowledge and 
action by narrow interests willing to expend the energy to sift through 
information.93 Probably the most forceful arguments along these lines have 
been provided by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, who 
argue that transparency works to overload citizens with information and 
thereby stunts action while providing certain groups access to information 
that helps them protect their own narrow interests.94 
 
 90 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC 
WRITINGS 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953). 
 91 Fenster, supra note 11, at 899 (stating “modern political theory and open government legislation” 
assume that transparency enables “informed individual choice and collective, democratic 
decisionmaking”); James R. Hollyer et al., Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability, 109 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 764, 764–67 (2015); Pozen, Transparency, supra note 20, at 161 (“Certain forms of 
transparency concerning the basic contours of government action may well be prerequisites to individual 
and collective self-determination and can be justified without consequentialist assumptions.”). 
 92 Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 
99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 41 (2005). 
 93 ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 181–82 (2007) (discussing how transparency 
results in lower-quality deliberations and empower “narrow interest groups”); Daniel C. Esty, Good 
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1531 
(2006) (“But participation has a potential downside that must be addressed squarely: the risk that special 
interests will take advantage of open decisionmaking processes to distort policy outcomes.”); Fenster, 
supra note 11, at 907–08 (“Frequent FOIA requesters include businesses that seek the records of 
competitors for commercial motivations, individuals seeking personal and family records from the Social 
Security Administration for genealogical research, or litigants attempting to circumvent discovery rules 
in suits against the government.”); Pozen, Transparency, supra note 20, at 156–58 (arguing that 
transparency frequently empowers corporate interests at the expense of more public interests); Adam M. 
Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 909, 921 (2006) (arguing that transparency “can facilitate rent-seeking at the expense of the common 
good”); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 
8 IND. L.J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 367, 372–73 (2001). 
 94 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 16. Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s argument, though framed 
quite broadly, assumes governments are making enough information available that citizens feel 
overloaded and probably ought to read as a critique of transparency that causes information overload, 
rather than transparency itself. Id.; see also ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND 
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 73–74 (2007) (arguing that goals of transparency thwarted by public often 
misinterpreting information disclosed while other parties use information for private goals like profit); 
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There has been little empirical study of whether administrative 
transparency increases public participation. Most experimental studies on the 
impact of third-party information disclosure focuses on voter behavior, not 
citizen interactions with bureaucracies.95 To the extent that researchers have 
studied participation in bureaucratic processes, they have focused on citizen 
attitudes about and perceptions of local officials, not on actions that citizens 
might take in response to information about the performance of local 
officials.96 
Only a small number of studies have focused on aspects of governance 
other than voting, and some of these were conducted in developed 
democracies, leaving much empirical work to be done on administrative 
transparency. Some examples of the sorts of studies that have been 
completed, however, provide a window into the importance of research into 
contexts other than voting. Professor Daniel Gingerich, for example, found 
that public knowledge of higher levels of corruption within government 
increased participation in anti-government protests.97 Professors James 
Hollyer, Peter Rosendorff, and James Vreeland presented a theoretical model 
predicting that transparency can increase group protest in autocratic regimes 
by changing the beliefs of individuals about the probability that others will 
also participate.98 Professor Ben Worthy reviewed the U.K.’s Open Data 
transparency program, which releases data about public spending, and found 
 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 
651, 689, 720 (2011) (arguing that the costs of time, effort, and money associated with transparency 
undermine its potential benefit to citizens); Caroline Bradley, Transparency Is the New Opacity: 
Constructing Financial Regulation After the Crisis, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 7, 7 (2011) (demonstrating 
how transparency fails because it provides a limited, but also overwhelming amount of information to 
citizens); Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 400 (2010) 
(arguing that transparency only helps sophisticated parties, who fail to, in turn, adequately advise 
uneducated consumers based on the information). 
 95 See e.g., Alberto Chong et al., Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? 
A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification, 77 J. POL. 55 (2015); 
Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly 
Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 703 (2008); Rohini Pande, Can Informed Voters 
Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies, 3 ANN. REV. ECON. 215 (2011). 
 96 Jenny de Fine Licht, Policy Area as a Potential Moderator of Transparency Effects: An 
Experiment, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 361 (2014); Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen et al., The Effect of 
Transparency on Trust in Government: A Cross-National Comparative Experiment, 73 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 575 (2013); Stephan G. Grimmelikhuijsen & Albert J. Meijer, Effects of Transparency on the 
Perceived Trustworthiness of a Government Organization: Evidence from an Online Experiment, 24 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 137 (2012). 
 97 Daniel W. Gingerich, Corruption and Political Decay: Evidence from Bolivia, 4 Q.J. POL. SCI. 1 
(2009). 
 98 Hollyer et al., supra note 91, at 764–67. 
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little mobilization results from administrative transparency.99 Even when it 
comes to the effect of third-party information disclosure (rather than 
administrative transparency), much work remains to be done, and better 
empirical results are needed. 
B. The Accountability Hypothesis 
Another key motivation of advocates of transparency is to give the 
public a tool to hold the government accountable. Transparency is viewed as 
a catalyst to action by the public that will lead to greater official 
accountability.100 We refer to this notion as the accountability hypothesis. 
Generally speaking, administrative transparency comes with 
knowledge of the functioning of government. This knowledge may allow the 
public to seek accountability from elected officials and bureaucrats via 
elections, oversight of agencies, participation in policy and program design, 
protest, and litigation.101 By encouraging the public to pursue some or all of 
these channels, administrative transparency might work to reduce 
corruption,102 disincentivize self-interested behavior by officials,103 expose 
the role of interest groups in policymaking,104 and reward more reasoned and 
socially-optimal policies.105 Although scholars, judges, and commentators 
 
 99 Ben Worthy, The Impact of Open Data in the UK: Complex, Unpredictable, and Political, 93 PUB. 
ADMIN. 788 (2015). 
 100 CHAYES & HANDLER CHAYES, supra note 38, at 22–23; VERMEULE, supra note 93, at 182; David 
Gartner, Uncovering Bretton Woods: Conditional Transparency, the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 121, 122 (2013); Schauer, supra note 11, at 1347–50; 
Shkabatur, supra note 55, at 82–83; Stewart, supra note 14, at 258–61. 
 101 AMAN, JR. & MAYTON, supra note 89, at 581 (“[Open government] also, however, is in accord 
with a healthy sense of distrust of governmental power as well and the need to control agency discretion 
to ensure that the law is administered properly. In this sense, open government and the publicity that goes 
along with it provides not only valuable information but a means of effectively constraining government 
and thus protecting citizens from any potential abuses of governmental power that may exist.”). 
 102 See 2 JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN BOWRING, Essay on Political Tactics, in THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 301, 310 (William Tait ed., 1843) (1838) (arguing that greater publicity pressures 
government officials to adhere to their duties); BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 92 (describing transparency as 
“a remedy for social and industrial diseases”). 
 103 VERMEULE, supra note 93, at 179–82 (“Transparency . . . helps to promote impartiality by 
suppressing self-interested official behavior.”); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional 
Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1288–89 (2001). 
 104 VERMEULE, supra note 93, at 185–86 (“[S]elf-interested agents also have incentives to keep secret 
some aspects of budgeting that their principals would be eager to monitor—namely, the use of budgets 
to provide benefits to well-funded and well-organized special interests that will reward lawmakers with 
campaign funds.”). 
 105 ROSE-ACKERMANN, supra note 14, at 127–32 (discussing the use of incentives to reduce 
corruption among elected officials); Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public 
Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life, in GLOBALIZING RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY 
LECTURES 1999, at 115–16 (Matthew J. Gibney ed., 2003); Kagan, supra note 89, at 2331–32. 
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widely agree that transparency achieves some or all these noble ends, this 
widespread agreement does not and cannot establish the validity of these 
assumptions. 
While transparency has been exported from more developed 
democracies to developing democracies through a number of avenues, little 
is known about how administrative transparency functions in developing 
democracies, nor whether it provides any measurable benefit. It is often said 
that correlation is not causation. And indeed, we would expect well-
functioning governments in developed democracies to have less to hide and 
therefore to be more transparent than governments rife with corruption and 
waste. In the context of developing countries, both transparency and 
government accountability are elusive. Neither side of this relationship 
means that transparency causes more accountable governments. 
Researchers have conducted studies, even randomized controlled trials, 
trying to measure the impact of informational disclosure by third parties. As 
mentioned in Part II, despite some shared attributes with administrative 
transparency, third-party disclosure is fundamentally different from 
transparency. Still, the lessons of these information disclosure studies are 
relevant to our study—not only as background for the reader on our research 
context, but also because these prior studies helped shape the design of our 
experiments. 
A number of studies in developing democracies have provided evidence 
that disclosure makes public officials more likely to increase government 
effectiveness, particularly when the information disclosed is tied to electoral 
sanctioning. In a seminal study, Professors Ferraz and Finan show that in 
Brazil, releasing official audits of municipal budgets that exposed corruption 
before elections decreased the reelection of corrupt local officials.106 
Professors Reinikka and Svensson’s research shows that a government-led 
newspaper campaign in Uganda disclosing education spending to primary 
schools resulted in reduced corruption and increased funds reaching the 
schools.107 Professors Grossman and Michelitch find that an information 
dissemination campaign resulted in higher legislative performance scores 
from constituents,108 suggesting that accountability through information 
dissemination resulted in more responsive governing by those being held 
 
 106 Ferraz & Finan, supra note 95, at 704–05. 
 107 See Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from 
a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 259, 260–67 (2005). 
 108 Guy Grossman & Kristin Michelitch, Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and 
Politician Performance Between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 280, 
280–81 (2018). 
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accountable. Professors Bjorkman and Svensson find that the disclosure of 
report cards about health facilities facilitated community monitoring in 
Uganda, decreased child mortality by 33%, and increased the utilization of 
health services by local residents.109 All this suggests that disclosure 
interventions that help citizens act on information about the shortfalls of 
governments are often effective, though the types of public action in 
response to information were often not the focus of research. 
However, other studies have reported less encouraging results. 
Professors Humphreys and Weinstein found that disseminating scorecards 
about the legislative performance of members of parliament seemed to have 
short-term influence on voter perceptions of incumbents but did not 
ultimately change voter or politician behavior,110 perhaps because of spin by 
politicians. Additionally, there is strong evidence that politicians can and 
have hampered or delayed transparency initiatives when they threaten rents 
from corruption.111 
Because so many have put so much stock in the participation and 
accountability transparency hypotheses, empirical testing of transparency 
would provide critical insight into important questions in law, governance 
studies, international development, and public administration. While the 
logic of these hypotheses resonates with democratic intuition, they remain 
untested in developing democracies. A better understanding of the impacts 
of transparency seems relevant not only to many scholars—champions and 
skeptics alike—but also to the many policymakers, foundations, and 
institutions of international governance who have rallied around the cause of 
spreading transparency abroad. The question seems especially relevant for 
nations and institutions in developed democracies that attempt to export 
transparency.112 After all, the prospect of limiting aid, trade, and 
development comes at a significant cost to those who live in developing 
democracies. 
III. DESIGNING A TRANSPARENCY TEST 
Much rides on the two transparency hypotheses, particularly in 
developing democracies where civil society and institutions are weak. Does 
 
 109 Martina Björkman & Jakob Svensson, Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field 
Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda, 124 Q.J. ECON. 735, 736 (2009). 
 110 Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and 
Political Accountability in Uganda—Preliminary Analysis 3 (Int’l Growth Ctr., Working Paper No. S-
5021-UGA-1, 2012), https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Humphreys-Weinstein-2012-
Working-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM9W-HZEH]. 
 111 Jennifer L. Bussell, Why Get Technical? Corruption and the Politics of Public Service Reform in 
the Indian States, 43 COMP. POL. STUD. 1230, 1237–38 (2010). 
 112 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
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administrative transparency help in those contexts? If so, administrative 
transparency might help jump-start democracy. If not, it might be better to 
focus attention and resources for development elsewhere. In this Part, we 
begin by discussing our research setting and opportunity. We then move on 
to explain the design of our two experiments and discuss features of the 
design relevant to each of the transparency hypotheses. 
A. Project Setting and Opportunity 
In order to test transparency, a research opportunity required identifying 
a government willing to increase transparency of its actions along with a 
willingness of that government to somehow randomize the transparency it 
provides and a commitment to cooperate with researchers to study 
transparency’s effects. Fortunately, those stars did align in a collaborative 
research project we performed with the management of a development 
program in Uganda’s Bwindi Impenetrable Forest National Park.113 While 
the Park itself draws tourists from all over the world, the nearly one hundred 
villages bordering the Park are severely impoverished, with an average 
household of seven people earning less than a dollar a day.114 The Park shares 
a percentage of the fees collected from tourists with these poor communities 
to fund local development projects, such as purchasing livestock (such as 
chickens or goats) for village residents, building or improving roads, 
constructing schools, installing water tanks, and planting tea plants and thorn 
bushes up to the forest edge to prevent animal incursions. 
While the potential impact of these development projects is appreciated 
by local people, difficulties plague the government’s program for delivering 
projects. Planning is not always equitable, and beneficiaries are not always 
designated fairly.115 During implementation, the misdirection of funds and 
 
 113 We developed a relationship with the Park over the course of years. The relationship began with 
an offer to help with policy issues on a volunteer basis by one of the coauthors. Over time, it has grown 
into an ongoing research endeavor that is guided by the researchers and Park leaders finding areas of 
common interest and cooperating to both pursue worthwhile research and further the reach of Park 
management to address practical challenges. 
 114 Andrew Masinde, Bwindi Hospital Puts Food on the Table of Undernourished Batwa, NEW 
VISION (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1330344/bwindi-hospital-food-
table- undernourished-batwa [https://perma.cc/XME4-SXFD]. 
 115 Karen Archabald & Lisa Naughton-Treves, Tourism Revenue-Sharing Around National Parks in 
Western Uganda: Early Efforts to Identify and Reward Local Communities, 28 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 
135, 143–44 (2001); Ann Laudati, Ecotourism: The Modern Predator? Implications of Gorilla Tourism 
on Local Livelihoods in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda, 28 ENVTL. & PLANNING D: SOC. 
& SPACE 726, 729–30 (2010); David Mwesigye Tumusiime & Paul Vedeld, False Promise or False 
Premise? Using Tourism Revenue Sharing to Promote Conservation and Poverty Reduction in Uganda, 
10 CONSERVATION & SOC. 15, 21–25 (2012). 
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corruption creates additional challenges.116 The money passes through 
several layers of government from the time it leaves the national 
government’s coffers until it reaches local people.117 Specifically, under 
Ugandan national guidelines, to fund local development projects, the Park 
passes money to the district levels of government (akin to states in the United 
States), districts pass it on to subcounties (akin to counties in the United 
States), and subcounties work with village-level committees to select 
contractors, then disperse the money to complete projects.118 
Traditionally, the Park has attempted to provide a degree of 
transparency by releasing funds to other levels of government publicly, in 
the presence of leaders from all affected levels of government.119 However, 
the specific amount of funds transferred to each village was not disclosed to 
ordinary residents of the local communities. Thus, as money disappeared and 
mismanagement occurred, there was no way for residents to recognize funds 
were missing, though, as we would later learn from residents we 
encountered, they frequently suspected foul play. 
When funds for local development projects do not make it to the local 
level, it poses problems not only for the villages, but for the Park as well. 
Funding local development projects helps the Park foster goodwill.120 That 
goodwill is critical because the Park relies on local cooperation to fulfill its 
conservation mission. The Park’s rangers cannot regularly monitor even 
major threats to forest resources, like poaching and logging. In fact, the dense 
forest vegetation makes it hard for them to detect illegal activities even when 
they are in the vicinity. Without goodwill, preventing practices such as 
trapping and timber harvesting by local people is even more difficult. 
Additionally, besides these development projects, the most visible presence 
of the Park is a contingent of armed forest guards stationed around the Park 
 
 116 PHIL FRANKS & MEDARD TWINAMATSIKO, LESSONS LEARNT FROM 20 YEARS OF REVENUE 




Park-Uganda.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEA5-5HY5]; Wilber Manyisa Ahebwa et al., Tourism Revenue 
Sharing Policy at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda: A Policy Arrangements Approach, 20 J. 
SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 377, 386–89 (2012); Archabald & Naughton-Treves, supra note 115, at 143–44; 
Tumusiime & Vedeld, supra note 115, at 21–25. 
 117 Ahebwa, supra note 116, at 386–89. 
 118 UGANDA WILDLIFE AUTH., GUIDELINES FOR REVENUE SHARING BETWEEN WILDLIFE 
PROTECTED AREAS AND ADJACENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITIES 14 (2013). 
 119 We gleaned this information from conversations with both Park officials and local people—the 
intended beneficiaries of the development projects. The Park continued this practice during the period of 
our experiments as well. 
 120 Ahebwa, supra note 116, at 386. 
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in significant part to monitor the use of the Park by local people, which 
predictably evokes negative feelings from the nearby residents. 
When we first met the Park’s leadership in 2012, they expressed a desire 
to increase the percentage of funds expended that actually benefited local 
people. We asked Park managers what they thought would help. They told 
us they desired more interaction with local villages. This included providing 
increased transparency about the Park’s revenue-sharing program. 
Transparency caught our interest: why had the Park not already provided 
transparency about the administration of the revenue-sharing program? 
The first difficulty the Park’s leaders mentioned was that the poor 
quality of the roads in and around the Park made it difficult for local people 
to access Park headquarters and for the Park’s staff to access the villages in 
the area. All the roads were unpaved, and many were built on steep mountain 
terrain. Sometimes roads made their way through dense forests, and 
sometimes they went long distances to avoid doing so. Additionally, the 
torrential storms of the rainforest regularly washed out the roads, making 
them impassible for long periods of time. 
Second, we learned that not all the villages eligible for revenue sharing 
are even on a road. Reaching some of them requires hiking several hours up 
and down steep slopes. This means that Park rangers have only infrequent 
contact with residents in many villages, stifling the flow of information that 
might help residents participate and hold officials accountable. 
Third, until recently, very few people in the villages had access to long 
distance communication beyond a community radio, which made it 
challenging to transmit village-specific information about project planning 
or implementation. Even as cell phone technology has become more 
common, most phone users do not have phones capable of accessing the 
internet—and even if they do, the users generally cannot afford to go online 
frequently. 
Fourth, the Park faced tight timelines from the time that officials in 
Kampala put money for local development projects on the books of the Park 
to the time those funds ought to be dispersed. With the limited resources the 
Park had, it could not visit each village and explain to the residents what to 
expect (and therefore what to monitor for in terms of corruption). 
We agreed with the Park that we would build a communication network 
that would allow dissemination of targeted, village-specific information to 
residents around the Park who are eligible to benefit from revenue sharing. 
While we believe that this partnership between researchers and managers of 
a national park was the first of its kind, researchers have suggested, in other 
contexts, that ubiquitous mobile phones even in the poorest countries might 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1294 
decrease barriers of cost, distance, time, and processing that limit 
information access by the public.121 
In the Park, we also found a government partner who was anxious to 
work with us to test strategies for improving the planning and delivery of 
revenue-sharing projects. In order to test transparency, we needed to 
compare a treatment group (i.e., those receiving additional transparency) 
with a control group (i.e., those not receiving additional transparency). Our 
partner would need to make new information available to the public in 
randomly-assigned villages through the platform we developed. Ultimately, 
the Park’s leaders wanted to know if the transparency intervention worked, 
as such evidence could help with decisions about how to invest in 
technologies that could facilitate transparency across the national parks 
system. Some staff strongly favored more transparency and were skeptical 
about randomizing it to only some places, but these Park officials agreed that 
transparency for some was better than transparency for none, particularly 
when we emphasized the value of learning for future investments and efforts. 
We ended up with a subscriber base of about 3,000 residents living in 
villages surrounding the Park for our first experiment on planning and 
recruited another 3,000 (for a total of approximately 6,000 residents) for our 
second experiment on accountability. The subject pool was drawn from 
ninety-one villages surrounding the Park that are eligible for revenue 
sharing, each averaging about 200 households. We estimate that 
transparency messages were reaching about 7.5% of households in our first 
phase of research and about 15% in the second phase. 
 
 121 John C. Bertot et al., Using ICTs to Create a Culture of Transparency: E-Government and Social 
Media as Openness and Anti-Corruption Tools for Societies, 27 GOV’T INFO. Q. 264, 268 (2010) 
(discussing how information and communication technologies are seen as cost-effective and convenient 
methods to promote openness and transparency for the public); Robert I. Rotberg & Jenny C. Aker, 
Mobile Phones: Uplifting Weak and Failed States, 36 WASH. Q. 111, 114–16 (2013). 
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B. Experimental Design 
1. General Research Design 
Even though randomized controlled trials are often touted as “the gold 
standard” in testing causal evidence by scholars122 and jurists,123 they are 
extremely rare in legal scholarship.124 This is because, despite their value, 
 
 122 See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL 
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 218–220 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that “[c]ontrolled experiments are 
ideally suited for demonstrating causation” and “inferences based on well-executed randomized 
experiments are more secure than inferences based on well-executed observational studies”); Michael 
Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 933–34 (2011) (proposing that 
administrative law analyses make greater use of randomized control trials to evaluate impacts of agency 
actions); D. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119, 1140 (2017) (discussing how 
randomized controlled trials are the “gold standard” for investigating interventions); Daniel Martin Katz, 
Quantitative Legal Prediction—Or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-
Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 950 (2013) (calling randomized 
controlled trials the gold standard for testing new phenomena in a particular environment). 
 123 See In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 341 F. Supp. 3d 213, 
227 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“A randomized control study is widely considered the gold standard of human 
studies.”); Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 867, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Randomized 
clinical trials are ‘the gold standard for determining the relationship of an agent to a health outcome.’” 
(quoting Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 555 (3d ed. 2011))); United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 
2010 WL 2985257, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (“Randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled 
studies represent the ‘gold standard’ . . . .” (quoting In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 116, 125 (D. Mass. 2009))); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 
04-cv-10981-PBS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12737, *49 (Feb. 12, 2010) (“Experts must accord appropriate 
weights to different levels of evidence, i.e. a randomized, controlled trial, as the ‘gold standard’ of 
evidence, must be accorded greater weight than observational, non-controlled studies or case reports.”); 
In re Neurontin Litig., 612 F. Supp. at 125 (calling “double-blind, placebo-controlled [studies]” “the ‘gold 
standard’” (quoting Green et al., supra, at 338)); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (calling randomized control trials the gold 
standard “for determining whether a drug is related to the risk of developing an adverse health outcome”); 
Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating case studies are not a 
substitute for controlled studies or trials). 
 124 We completed a search on LexisNexis and found the vast majority of references to randomized 
control trials referred to those articles. The law review articles we found which conducted a randomized 
controlled trial (not all of these focused their paper on the trial) were fewer than three dozen. Some of the 
most interesting studies included the following: Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Body-Worn 
Cameras on Police Activity and Police-Citizen Encounters: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 108 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 511 (2018); Nélio Brazão et al., Promoting Emotion and Behavior Regulation in 
Male Prison Inmates: A Secondary Data Analysis from a Randomized Controlled Trial Testing the 
Efficacy of the Growing Pro-Social Program, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 57 (2018); D. James Greiner & 
Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does 
Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012); D. James Greiner et al., The 
Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and 
Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2013); D. James Greiner, What We Know and Need to 
Know About Outreach and Intake by Legal Services Providers, 67 S.C. L. REV. 287 (2016); Daniel E. 
Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2017); Dalié 
Jiménez et al., Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control 
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they are very difficult to deploy, particularly in policy settings. They not only 
take careful research design and demanding statistical analysis but can also 
take immense effort and resources.125 
The opportunity to randomly assign transparency is the most critical 
design feature in our tests, both in terms of fortune in finding a willing 
government partner and in its importance for drawing robust causal 
inferences. Since the two randomly-assigned groups are similar in 
expectation on measurable and unmeasurable factors, a randomized trial 
allows us to attribute any differences between treatment and control groups 
to the treatment variable (in our case transparency).126 
Since the Park-funded projects are proposed, approved, and 
implemented at the village level, we used villages as the unit of 
randomization. Approximately half of the villages were randomly assigned 
to receive the treatment messages (i.e., additional transparency), while the 
other half received messages from a local hospital promoting health as a 
placebo. Placebo messages with information on public health were used 
instead of no messages to ensure that we were not just measuring the effects 
of more contact from an external institution. 
We filed a plan for analysis of our data prior to assigning the treatment 
or collecting outcome data.127 We followed our pre-specified analytical 
 
Trial: A Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 449 (2013); Fernanda S. 
Rossi, et al., Detection of Intimate Partner Violence and Recommendation for Joint Family Mediation: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial of Two Screening Measures, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 239 (2015). Even 
though law review articles frequently cite to randomized controlled trials, we contend that legal scholars 
have not paid enough attention to legally relevant randomized control trials found in social science 
literature. 
 125 This study, for example, required finding, training, and stationing a project manager in the field 
for almost two years, ten international trips by the authors, the help of dozens of students both on the 
ground in Uganda and in the United States, meeting with and securing cooperation of a number of officials 
with foreign government agency, obtaining approvals from institutional review boards (which are 
designed to protect the interests of human subjects) both in the United States and abroad, securing 
government licenses and permits, seeking grants to pay for our numerous expenses, and much more. 
 126 The explanation provided here is extremely simplified. For the leading commentaries on 
randomized controlled trials most applicable to the law and social sciences, particularly focused in 
developing countries, see ALAN S. GERBER & DONALD P. GREEN, FIELD EXPERIMENTS: DESIGN, 
ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION (2012); RACHEL GLENNERSTER & KUDZAI TAKAVARASHA, RUNNING 
RANDOMIZED EVALUATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2013); James N. Druckman et al., The Growth and 
Development of Experimental Research in Political Science, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 627 (2006); 
Macartan Humphreys & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Field Experiments and the Political Economy of 
Development, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 367 (2009); Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, Field Experiments 
in Economics: The Past, the Present, and the Future, 53 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (2009). 
 127 Registering pre-analysis plans is meant to provide honesty among researchers about the 
hypotheses they set out to test and the methods they intend to use. It is an important tool to reduce post 
hoc culling of data to fish for results. For more information about registering pre-analysis plans and the 
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choices in estimating main effects, which helps guard against the possibility 
of searching for results using different analytical procedures. In particular, 
we relied on two types of analytical techniques. In this Article, we focus on 
a simple difference between treatment group and control group means 
without further adjustment for covariates.128 This provides for unbiased 
estimation of effects in a randomized trial (note that this is not the case for 
observational studies where treatment and control groups are likely to be 
different in expectation). Indeed, one of the benefits of randomly assigning 
treatment is that analytical techniques need not be complicated to uncover 
unbiased effects with a causal interpretation. 
For some extensions and robustness checks, we also performed 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions for each of the outcomes we 
measured, using the following estimating equation: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝜏𝜏1𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  +  𝑣𝑣ℎ  +  𝜖𝜖ℎ 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the outcome for individual i in village j, 𝛼𝛼 is a regression 
intercept, 𝜏𝜏1 is an estimate of the treatment effect, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is a binary treatment 
indicator that is positive when village j is treated, 𝛽𝛽 is a vector (series) of 
coefficients on the covariates (personal characteristics) for individual i, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is 
a matrix (X-by-n dataset) of covariates (characteristics measured at baseline) 
for individual i (including, most importantly, the baseline measurement of 
the variable being tested), 𝑣𝑣ℎ is a measure of fixed effects for the individual’s 
subcounty h, and 𝜖𝜖ℎ is a clustered error term for subcounty h.129 We estimated 
a separate regression for each outcome of interest using this equation.130 Note 
that the OLS regression should provide the same answer for treatment effects 
as a difference-in-means analysis in expectation, but with more precision in 
errors, since this approach models the variation in outcomes associated with 
other covariates and fixed effects. 
In addition to randomizing on the village level, to account for factors 
that could impact outcomes at the subcounty level (which is a higher level of 
governance than the village level), we blocked the randomization on the 
 
purposes for registering them, see Registration, EVIDENCE GOVERNANCE & POL., 
http://egap.org/content/registration [https://perma.cc/2F2F-TUSA]; see also Mark Buntaine et al., Does 
Transparency Educate and Mobilize Citizens? A Field Experiment with Revenue-Sharing Funds in 
Bwindi National Park, Uganda: A Pre-Analysis Plan for Phase I, EVIDENCE GOVERNANCE & POL., 
20160517AD (2016) [hereinafter Buntaine et al., Pre-Analysis Plan], https://egap.org/file/1327/ 
download?token=p8c7OzaE [https://perma.cc/T8RL-K8YM]. 
 128 Buntaine et al., Pre-Analysis Plan, supra note 127, at 9. 
 129 Note that the clustering of standard errors is irrelevant in our empirical analysis, since we report 
sharp null standard errors from randomization inference, as described in our pre-analysis plan. Id. 
 130 Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development?, supra note 31, at 413 (explaining that the main specification for estimating individual-
level treatment effects is an OLS regression). 
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subcounty level, which ensures a balance of treatment and control units 
within blocks and maximizes the statistical power to detect effects. Multiple 
villages receive funds for development projects from the same subcounty. 
Since a common problem might present similar problems to all the villages 
receiving funds within a subcounty (e.g., mismanagement or corruption), 
village level outcomes may be impacted by this clustering. Similarly, 
villages in each subcounty have similar geographic location and constraints, 
which may predict levels of participation in revenue sharing. In cases where 
subcounties had an odd number of villages, the final village had an equal 
chance of being assigned treatment or control. 
Through our research design, we also estimated spillover effects 
between treatment and control villages: would providing one village 
transparency result in a nearby village also receiving the information and 
thereby having different outcomes? Certainly, there is a lot of interaction 
between people from different villages, so we had to worry that these 
interactions might contaminate the control group. To account for this 
possibility, we performed a robustness check of our analysis by including a 
variable for the treatment status of geographically contiguous villages and 
interacted it with the indicator for the direct treatment status. We also 
performed other robustness checks by increasing the bounds of continuity, 
but the tests did not provide any consistent evidence of spillover in our data, 
and modeling to control for potential spillover did not alter our 
conclusions.131 
2. Research Design for the Participation Hypothesis 
Our test of the participation hypothesis was intended to provide 
evidence on the effect of administrative transparency on citizen participation. 
In creating and interpreting our test, we tried to understand the causal chain 
between administrative transparency and citizen participation. To do this, we 
drew on and modified the model of participation described by Professors 
Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai, which examines the impact of different kinds 
of information on people’s perceptions about the value of participation in 
public affairs.132 
As Figure 1 illustrates, transparency messages might include two 
different kinds of information relevant to participation. First, it could inform 
people how to become involved—including where and when meetings were 
 
 131 We provide a more complete explanation of our methods in our two other papers about this work. 
See id. at 412–13; Buntaine & Daniels, Diffuse Responsibility Undermines Public Oversight, supra note 
31, at 18. Note that both papers have extensive associated appendices. 
 132 Evan S. Lieberman et al., Does Information Lead to More Active Citizenship? Evidence from an 
Education Intervention in Rural Kenya, 60 WORLD DEV. 69, 74–76, 81 (2014) (finding no substantial 
impact on any of a range of outcomes associated with public or private citizen activism). 
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held, the rules governing the meetings, and how to participate at the 
meetings. Second, transparency could provide information to help 
individuals understand the value of participation. 
The first type of transparency information might increase participation 
by reminding the person about opportunities to participate and removing 
logistical obstacles to participation. The second type of transparency 
information might increase participation by altering the judgments people 
make about the value of participation. Information provided through 
transparency can communicate to recipients that their participation is 
important—that they can contribute to a process that matters. This 
understanding might, in turn, affect a person’s preferences and cause her to 
prioritize participation over other competing uses of her time. Acting on 
those preferences would then lead to increased participation. That 
participation would then provide opportunities to learn about other 
participation opportunities, which in turn might shape future judgments, 
preferences, and actions. 
 
FIGURE 1: ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE PARTICIPATION HYPOTHESIS 
 
Over an eight-month period, we worked with the Park to craft and then 
send to all individuals in treatment villages SMS text messages with 
pertinent and timely information detailing various aspects of the Park’s local 
development program. The messages focused both on the logistical aspects 
of participating in project planning and the value of citizen participation. 
Messages about logistics included suggestions about whom to contact for 
information about planning meetings, how to find out where and when a 
meeting would be held, and the role of locally-selected committees in putting 
together proposals for the Park. Messages that highlighted the benefits of 
participating in local planning meetings focused on the purpose of those 
meetings—the selection of local development projects. Because projects 
would be proposed by local people and were meant to benefit them, the 
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planning process would provide obvious and concrete ways that a potential 
participant might benefit.133 
Much of this information was only made available to residents through 
the treatment messages, though some of it might have been available through 
village leaders or otherwise present in local knowledge from past years’ 
planning processes.134 The messaging platform provided the first consistent, 
regular source of information about the planning process available in this 
area. 
We examine the impacts of these transparency messages on 
participation in two ways. First, we reviewed attendance rolls for each of the 
villages and also asked respondents to self-report their participation in 
community meetings. Second, we surveyed all individuals in our subject 
pool (both treatment and control) before sending treatment messages (i.e., 
baseline surveys) and then again after the treatment period when the planning 
process had ended (i.e., endline surveys). These survey measures included 
questions related to subjects’ perceptions: whether individuals felt there were 
opportunities to contact the Park about revenue sharing and whether they 
agreed that people like them had opportunities to participate effectively in 
planning. Using these measures, we were able to estimate the impact of 
transparency on individual-level outcomes related to participation and, 
because of the randomization, infer that any observed differences between 
treatment and control groups were due to the transparency messages. 
3. Research Design for the Accountability Hypothesis 
The literature on administrative transparency and accountability 
suggests that unless information disclosure is both targeted and actionable 
(i.e., it allows citizens to more clearly see how government actions implicate 
their interests and also how citizens can use the information to promote their 
own interests), interventions often struggle to drive impact.135 Most 
information disclosure experiments in the developing world focus on elected 
 
 133 We recognize the argument that our messages were dissimilar to most transparency initiatives in 
nontrivial respects: the information was culled for and then delivered to the public by our messaging 
system, not directly by government. Still, those receiving the messages were informed that our messaging 
system—though independent from the government—was still acting as conduit to disperse information 
for the government. 
 134 Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development?, supra note 31, at 411 (explaining that the messages sent by the Bwindi Information 
Network went out during the planning phase of the revenue-sharing program). 
 135 See generally Stephen Kosack & Archon Fung, Does Transparency Improve Governance?, 
17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 65, 83–84 (2014) (analyzing sixteen studies and arguing the studies suggest 
transparency interventions will have greater success when they provide information and a course of action 
to address problems). 
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officials.136 We recognized that tools for holding bureaucrats accountable 
would necessarily differ from those for holding elected politicians 
accountable. In particular, bureaucrats do not face reelection, and so the tools 
for holding them accountable must address other incentives, like career 
progression, job security, and professional prestige. 
The model of administrative accountability that reflects our 
understanding of how administrative transparency creates government 
accountability grows out of the insight that “[t]he diffusion of power carries 
with it a diffusion of accountability.”137 When many people have 
responsibility for administering public programs, it is more difficult to hold 
any one person accountable for problems. Without transparency, citizens do 
not know whom to hold to account, let alone the outcomes they are 
responsible for, which unsurprisingly results in disengagement and inaction. 
Officials blame each other for problems, and the concerns of citizens are 
passed off with nobody ultimately claiming responsibility. As Hamilton put 
it in The Federalist Papers, when a number of officials share overlapping 
and diffuse duties in an area of administration, we struggle to “determine on 
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of 
pernicious measures ought really to fall.”138 
Providing transparency that sets expectations for citizens about what 
government ought to be doing can help surface information about specific 
problems. In turn, information about specific problems might heighten the 
duty to act by officials. We might posit that officials are more likely to pass 
blame about general problems but will need to act on specific problems 
identified by citizens to be in their area of authority. Thus, transparency 
about both the government performance and the expectations citizens should 
have for government could in turn produce demands for accountability. It 
could also produce information about specific problems that could clarify 
and highlight the responsibility of government officials to respond. 
This idea that more information changes the standard for judging 
accountability is what gave punch to Senator Howard Baker’s famous 
question about Watergate: “What did the [P]resident know, and when did he 
know it?”139 The principle that possession of information triggers specific 
 
 136 See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. 
 137 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010). 
 138 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 139 Connie Cass, Remembering Howard Baker, Whose Famous Question Embodied the Watergate 
Hearings, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 26, 2014, 5:59 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
politics/remembering-howard-baker-whose-famous-question-embodied-watergate-hearings 
[https://perma.cc/EZ4S-BNYC]. 
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duties is prevalent in the law—information can create duties to disclose,140 
duties to warn,141 and duties of care.142 Consistent with this theory, Professors 
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and Margit Tavits argue that the key to stemming 
corruption in developing democracies is clarifying the responsibilities of 
officials.143 We expect that citizens will be more likely to provide 
information about specific problems and seek accountability when they 
know what they should expect from government. In turn, it will be easier to 
clarify responsibility and instigate action when officials have knowledge of 
specific problems. 
In developing our research design, we considered how transparency 
messages that told residents about their approved projects could trigger 
accountability. In particular, this meant making sure that the official charged 
with overseeing the local development projects understood that a failure to 
act on specific problems brought to light by people who knew what to expect 
would reflect poorly on him or her by at least the community and perhaps by 
 
 140 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (holding that a duty to disclose 
“arose from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take 
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure”); Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 731 F.2d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (“During the course of negotiations 
surrounding a business transaction, a duty to disclose may arise . . . where one party possesses superior 
knowledge, not readily available to the other, and knows that the other is acting on the basis of mistaken 
knowledge.”); Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 745 (Cal. 1976) (A duty to disclose “may exist when 
one party to a transaction has sole knowledge or access to material facts and knows that such facts are 
not known to or reasonably discoverable by the other party.”). 
 141 See, e.g., STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 6A AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 18:349 (2019), Westlaw 
AMLOT (explaining that for the duty to warn in allergy tort cases, “[s]ome older decisions state that the 
defendant must have actual knowledge . . . . However, other cases hold the defendant to a duty to warn 
of a danger the defendant should know about as an expert, regardless of his or her actual knowledge” 
(footnotes omitted)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating the law that 
there existed a “duty to warn of all dangers of which [people] had actual or constructive knowledge”); 
Zipkin v. Rubin Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1040, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“[S]uperior knowledge of 
the danger is essential before there is a duty to warn.”). 
 142 See, e.g., Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2002) (“[F]or almost a century, 
the law in Texas has been that absent actual knowledge, utilities are not liable for dangerous conditions 
on customers’ property—the duty of care generally ends at the meter box.”) (footnote omitted). For other 
states with the same duty of care law, see id. at 224 n.9. 
 143 LESLIE A. SCHWINDT-BAYER & MARGIT TAVITS, CLARITY OF RESPONSIBILITY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION (2016); see also Margit Tavits, Clarity of Responsibility and 
Corruption, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 218, 218, 227 (2007). The authors theorize that different types of political 
institutions in democracies lead to different levels of corruption, based on the extent to which 
responsibility for public policy outcomes is clear. Id. at 218. Because curbing corruption requires voters 
to punish the misuse of public office in democracies, when voters are unable to pinpoint the source of 
failures in governance, the main mechanism that might ensure accountability breaks down. Id. at 220. In 
particular, the authors find that clear majority control of policy, low cabinet turnover, long cabinet 
duration, and low opposition influence over policy are associated with less corruption. Id. at 227. 
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those charged with supervising the official. Key to doing this would not only 
involve bringing information to those with duties to address problems, but 
also ensuring they knew their shirking was visible. This meant making it 
clear that other officials were aware that the responsible official knew about 
specific problems, and that the official should be acting on problems. By 
clarifying to all parties—the public, responsible officials, and related 
officials—expectations for what public programs should deliver, we 
predicted that delivery of local development projects would improve.144 
As illustrated in Figure 2, in transforming the theory of bureaucratic 
accountability into a testable accountability hypothesis, we focused on 
creating a transparency message that communicated to the public what public 
officials should deliver if they were doing their jobs effectively. The public 
official role we focused on was the district chief administrative officer, who 
has the duty to oversee funds allotted for local development projects, which 
are mostly managed by the subcounty below the level of district. In order to 
transform a chief administrative officer’s diffuse duty to provide oversight 
into a more particular duty to address problems in implementation, we 
presented official information that both (1) would trigger a duty of the 
official to act; (2) let him know that other high-ranking national officials (i.e., 
the chief warden of Bwindi National Park) were aware of the fact that he was 
in possession of the information that triggered the duty; and (3) the public 
knew about what they should expect if their local development project was 
implemented well. 
To do this, we sent information to subjects once the Park transferred 
money to the district for their local development project. In particular, we 
sent messages to residents in treatment villages about the sort of 
development projects the Park had funded for their communities and the 
amount of money that their community would have to implement the project. 
We also followed up with the treated subjects. We told them about the 
procedures for resolving problems that they had identified with the 
implementation of their local development project, who and how to contact 
about problems, and how to file an official complaint with the chief 
administrative officer about corruption or mismanagement by the contractor 
charged with delivering the project or with subcounty government officials. 
 
 144 One complication of our test of the accountability hypothesis is that while the Park desired 
transparency, its disclosure of information in many ways allowed the public to infer bad actions from 
individuals in different levels of government, even though those other levels of government were 
themselves providing transparency. While we recognize this complication in our experimental design, it 
is important to recognize that, in many cases where transparency exposes bad actors, the bad actors 
themselves have not put the transparency initiative in place and may even work to undermine the 
transparency that ultimately exposes them. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1304 
Because we worried that local people might be hesitant to file 
complaints, we also surveyed subjects every two weeks and asked them if 
they had seen evidence of any progress on local development projects. We 
then compiled the results of these polls and created reports updating the 
district chief administrative officers about problems reported by the public. 
To make these reports salient to the chief administrative officer, we worked 
with the head official of the Park, the chief warden, who certified the reports, 
attached a cover letter, and had the reports hand-delivered by Park staff to 
the office of each district’s chief administrative officer. The chief warden 
also called each district chief administrative officer and confirmed the 
delivery of the first report and offered to answer any questions they might 
have about the report. Figure 2 shows the hypothesized causal chain for the 
chief administrative officer, who provides oversight. 
FIGURE 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK UNDERLYING THE ACCOUNTABILITY HYPOTHESIS 
 
We wanted each district chief administrative officer to understand three 
things: (1) that problems existed in projects that the chief administrative 
officer oversaw; (2) that members of the community had reported these 
problems and knew that there were deviations from the outcome that they 
should expect; and (3) that the chief warden understood these problems 
existed and was asking the chief administrative officer to act. We expected 
that the common knowledge of expectations and problems through 
transparency would set this logic into motion for the chief administrative 
officers. 
We designed our treatment—across multiple vectors—to make the case 
to district chief administrative officers that they had a specific duty to 
provide oversight and remedy discrete problems. While we could not 
measure what was going on in the minds of the chief administrative officers, 
we performed audits to see which projects were delivered. We conducted 
these audits several months after projects had been approved and funds 
allocated. Each village was audited for progress on their project, and 
interviews with at least ten individuals in each village were collected. These 
audits and surveys were used to measure the causal impact of the 
transparency efforts and community monitoring on the successful 
implementation of the projects, as well as to measure differences in levels of 
overall satisfaction between treatment and control villages about local 
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development projects. The questions asked to measure satisfaction about the 
revenue-sharing program are the same as those asked in the participation 
experiment. 
IV. RESULTS OF THE TRANSPARENCY TESTS 
In this Part, we present the most important results of our tests of 
transparency. In contrast to the prior articles we have written on this 
experiment,145 we focus here on the results with the most relevance to the 
two main hypotheses about transparency. Additionally, to provide context 
for our findings, we also provide a number of qualitative results for the first 
time. We begin by discussing results relating to the participation hypothesis 
and then move on to discuss results for the accountability hypothesis. 
A. Results of Testing the Participation Hypothesis 
Our results can be divided into two parts. The first, which are given 
more credence, are those based on analyses that we intended to conduct at 
the outset of the experiment. In order to help eliminate questionable practices 
like data mining, the best practice in social science research is to file a pre-
analysis plan. The plan details the overall research design, what 
measurements will be taken, and what analyses will be conducted.146 The 
second type of results are those that were beyond the scope of our pre-
analysis plan. These include additional statistical analyses as well as 
qualitative research designed to help us understand our results. Such results, 
while still important, should be considered more exploratory. 
After all our efforts, when we gathered the data and conducted the 
empirical analysis of the measurements called for in our pre-analysis plan, 
we found no evidence to support the idea that transparency increased 
participation. In fact, on one measure—a self-assessed measurement about 
whether a subject felt he or she had an opportunity to participate—we 
observed what seemed to be a mild backfire effect, meaning those who 
received treatment were less likely to feel that they had an opportunity to 
participate effectively. Along all other measurements, the transparency 
intervention we employed failed to increase individuals’ participation in the 
planning and implementation of revenue-sharing programs. 
 
 145 See Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development?, supra note 31; Buntaine & Daniels, Diffuse Responsibility Undermines Public Oversight, 
supra note 31. 
 146 Our pre-analysis plan for testing the participation hypothesis was registered before we began our 
field research. See Buntaine et al., Pre-Analysis Plan, supra note 127. 
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Some of the core results for three main self-reported survey outcomes 
related to participation are displayed in Table 1. The top set of rows shows 
the average value by experimental condition and the difference between the 
treatment and control groups, along with bootstrapped standard errors for all 
values.147 We see that in no case did the treatment have a positive effect in 
the sample, as we had hypothesized. It even seems that there was a significant 
negative effect relative to perceived opportunities to participate (p = 0.03). 
When we dig further into the causes of this negative effect, we find that more 
disadvantaged groups—women, illiterate people, and impoverished 
people—experienced a negative effect in receiving transparency messages, 
while more advantaged groups did not. 
 
 
 147  To compute bootstrapped standard errors, we repeatedly drew with replacement observations 
from the dataset equal to the size of the actual group. The bootstrapped standard error records the standard 
deviation of the means of repeatedly drawn sets of observations. For more information, see generally B. 
Efron & R. Tibshirani, Bootstrap Methods for Standard Errors, Confidence Intervals, and Other 
Measures of Statistical Accuracy, 1 STATISTICAL SCI. 54 (1986). 
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TABLE 1: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PARTICIPATION OUTCOMES BY SUBGROUPINGS 
We also considered the total number of people who attended planning 
meetings. Unlike the survey-based outcomes described in Table 1, the 
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number of people in attendance at planning meetings was based on official 
attendance rolls collected by Park rangers148 and thus is not subject to the 
same concerns about self-reporting. As displayed in Figure 3, we also fail to 
observe differences in the number of people who attended planning meetings 
when comparing treatment and control villages.149 
 
 148 These underlying rolls are on file with the authors and not publicly available due to confidentiality 
protections. 
 149 Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development?, supra note 31, at 416 fig.6. 
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FIGURE 3: COMPARISON OF ATTENDANCE AT PLANNING MEETINGS  
BETWEEN TREATMENT AND CONTROL VILLAGES. 
 Note: This figure shows a count of villages that have attendance at different level in bins of 10 
attendees by treatment condition. This figure is adapted from Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach 
Increase Participation in Community-Driven Development?, supra note 31, at 416 fig.6. 
Why did our efforts not lead to greater participation? To interpret the 
results, we began digging deeper into the data we had collected, particularly 
looking for an explanation for the backfire effect we observed among more 
disadvantaged groups.150 We had a number of theories about these results, 
but decided to collect more data to help guide our thinking. To extend our 
work beyond that called for in the pre-analysis plan, we first generated a 
randomized list of individuals who received the transparency treatment but 
 
 150 Id. at 416. 
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who had indicated they did not perceive opportunities for them to participate 
in the planning process. We called twenty people from this list at random, 
asking if they could provide us further detail.151 
Our participants’ comments touched on several consistent themes. 
Respondents cited feelings of frustration with elite capture of local planning 
efforts, exclusion from the process, and even hopelessness about benefiting 
from or even affecting the outcomes of the planning meetings.152 To 
illustrate, consider a few particularly poignant comments we received, each 
from different individuals we contacted. 
It’s only because we don’t share on the funds so we are like tired of attending 
the meetings. In[ ]fact, [r]evenue sharing has no importance to me. 
I don’t perceive any opportunity of participating in the planning for my village’s 
revenue sharing because “meetings are hidden and you can’t know when and 
where the meetings happen.” “I have never been called for any revenue sharing 
meeting, we only meet people pulling goats and they tell us that they have got 
them from revenue sharing.” 
The major barrier here is local leaders deciding for the locals in their favor. 
I have never benefited from [revenue sharing] and I have lived in this village 
for more than 30 years. I don’t see any purpose of participating in the planning 
of something that doesn’t benefit me. 
I am no longer interested in the program because I have never received anything 
from the Park but every time you call me to ask me questions concerning the 
[P]ark, I feel annoyed to hear about that program. 
The only barrier I see is that even if I go to the meetings, my opinions are not 
going to be considered and addressed. 
“If it was you and you went to a meeting where your opinions are rejected[,] 
would you go back?” “I have always advocated for random selection of 
beneficiaries in my village for the revenue sharing projects but I have been 
failed by leaders.” “I may opt not to attend again.” 
“I would perceive opportunities to participate in the planning of my village’s 
revenue sharing program but I have one concern.” “Our leaders . . . select a 
 
 151 Id. at 418. The full transcripts of the responses to questions are available in the Supporting 
Information file permanently archived with the online file for Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach 
Increase Participation in Community-Driven Development?, supra note 31. Buntaine et al., 
Supplementary Data, Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development? A Field Experiment Near Bwindi National Park, Uganda, SCIENCEDIRECT, 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X17303510#s0115 
[https://perma.cc/W3LF-W45K]. 
 152 Id. 
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project of their choice and they submit its proposal to the sub county without 
our knowledge.”153 
For some subjects, the transparency treatment made clear the many 
ways in which they were systematically excluded from the revenue-sharing 
program. Because of this, the messages lessened their perception of their 
own ability to participate, perhaps by making their exclusion more salient to 
them. A number of studies have found similar backfire effects among those 
disadvantaged in societies where elite capture is prevalent.154 
Our exploratory work also uncovered another finding, this one more 
hopeful. In disaggregating the data in different ways, we found that 
participation and satisfaction levels increased when a relatively larger 
number of individuals in a village received the transparency messages and 
decreased when a smaller number of people in a community were provided 
transparency messages. This result suggests that transparency is most 
effective when it supports collective action to overcome elite capture, 
perhaps through a common understanding of what needs to be done. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, this saturation effect was observed in four of the 
outcomes we measured: participation in revenue-sharing meetings, 
satisfaction with information from the Park, satisfaction with Park 
management, and importance of protecting Bwindi National Park. While not 
present in the other outcomes, the magnitude of this effect was consistent in 
each of these four categories, leading us to tentatively conclude that 
transparency efforts are more likely to succeed the more people they can 
reach and prompt to action. 
 
 
 153 Telephone Interviews by Jeremiah Nahamya with twenty randomized subjects (Mar. 20, 2017).  
Buntaine et al., supra note 151, at 30–35 (quotation marks in original). 
 154 See, e.g., Aniruddha Dasgupta & Victoria A. Beard, Community Driven Development, Collective 
Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia, 38 DEV. & CHANGE 229, 238, 243–44 (2007); Scott A. Fritzen, 
Can the Design of Community-Driven Development Reduce the Risk of Elite Capture? Evidence from 
Indonesia, 35 WORLD DEV. 1359, 1370 (2007); Jens Friis Lund & Moeko Saito-Jensen, Revisiting the 
Issue of Elite Capture of Participatory Initiatives, 46 WORLD DEV. 104, 109 (2013); Lauren Persha & 
Krister Andersson, Elite Capture Risk and Mitigation in Decentralized Forest Governance Regimes, 
24 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 265, 274 (2014); Jean-Philippe Platteau, Monitoring Elite Capture in 
Community‐Driven Development, 35 DEV. & CHANGE 223, 227–28 (2004). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1312 
FIGURE 4: SHOWING THE SATURATION EFFECT IN TRANSPARENCY EFFORTS 
 Note: As the number of subjects receiving messages increased, measures of participation and 
satisfaction also increased. Number of subjects vs. marginal effect of treatment are plotted on the axes, 
while the distribution of villages with each number of subjects is shown along the x axis. This figure 
adapted from Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development?, supra note 31, at 418 fig.9.155 
 
 155 Buntaine et al., Can Information Outreach Increase Participation in Community-Driven 
Development?, supra note 31, at 418 fig.9. 
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B. Results of Testing the Accountability Hypothesis 
This finding of a potential saturation effect during the participation 
experiment led us to expend considerable effort to double the size of our 
study for the accountability stage, where we investigated whether 
transparency and resident monitoring could improve the delivery of 
projects.156 
In the accountability phase of the project, we randomly reassigned 
villages to receive information about approved projects along with access to 
a reporting platform that collected information about the implementation of 
projects. We again found no evidence that providing individuals with 
increased transparency and a means to act on it increased accountability. And 
remember, here we even coupled transparency with reports we created to put 
district chief administrative officers on notice that specific local 
development projects warranted their oversight and that the public and other 
government officials knew of the problems. Despite all this, both treatment 
and control villages had comparable levels of successfully implemented 
projects in both the village-level audits and our resident audits.157 In fact, 
treated villages seemed to fare a little worse on average.158 
We visited all the villages slated to receive development projects from 
the Park and performed an audit on the ground of these projects after they 
were supposed to be finished. We used a number of different metrics to check 
if a project had been successfully implemented: whether the implementation 
was finished, whether the implemented project was the same as the approved 
project, whether the project could be verified as complete, whether dispersed 
goods could be located, and whether the project was verified as having come 
from revenue sharing. We found no evidence that treatment villages 
performed better than control villages under any of these metrics.159 Figure 5 
displays these main outcomes. 
 
 156 Id. at 417–18. Given concerns about literacy rates and whether or not written messages were as 
impactful as voice messages, we moved to a new platform called Viamo between the two experiments so 
that we could rely on voice messages. 
 157 Buntaine & Daniels, Diffuse Responsibility Undermines Public Oversight, supra note 31, at 18–
21. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 18–19. 
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FIGURE 5: AUDIT OUTCOMES FOR ACCOUNTABILITY PHASE OF PROJECT 
 Note: error bars display bootstrapped standard errors within each experimental condition. 
We also performed resident audits during our village visits and found 
similar results using these measures. In resident audits, we completed in-
person interviews with at least twenty individuals in each village. These 
individuals were asked if the revenue-sharing projects had been implemented 
in their village, and whether they could show us physical evidence of the 
project.160 We found that there was no difference in any of these outcomes 
between treatment and control villages; both treatment and control villages 
had similar levels of successfully implemented projects and a similar ability 
to provide evidence for the projects, confirming what we found in the 
village-level audits described above.161 
During resident audits, we also asked questions about perceptions. 
These surveys measured residents’ perceptions of the revenue-sharing 
program that funded the local development projects, including their 
satisfaction with the program and Bwindi National Park, among other 
topics.162 Our results in this phase of the project were consistent with what 
we observed in the village and resident audits, as well as the results from the 
first phase of our study: residents in treatment villages did not report higher 
 
 160 Id. at 20. 
 161 Id. at 20–21 
 162 Id. at 22. 
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levels of satisfaction in any of the metrics we measured relative to the 
residents in control villages who received health messages.163 
Table 2 displays some of the main results for these measures. The top 
set of rows shows the pooled analysis for the entire experimental sample of 
residents surveyed. The Table shows results for five key outcomes: whether 
the resident had seen a revenue-sharing project being implemented, whether 
the resident was satisfied with the implementation of revenue-sharing, 
whether the resident would choose the same project again given the planning 
and implementation, whether the resident had ever seen corruption in 
revenue-sharing projects in their village, and whether the resident could 
show or direct us to physical evidence that a project was completed. On each 
of these measures, we did not observe any positive difference outside of what 
would be expected because of sampling error between the treatment and 
control group. There was no statistically significant evidence that 
transparency created the predicted outcomes of increased accountability.  
  
 
 163 Id. 
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TABLE 2: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON ACCOUNTABILITY OUTCOMES BY SUBGROUPINGS 
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This outcome surprised us even more than the results of our 
participation experiment. As we understood it, every prerequisite for a 
successful transparency initiative was in place, so why did the transparency 
treatment fail to have an impact in any of the many measures we examined? 
Why was community oversight unsuccessful in driving positive change? We 
expected that transparency about the allocation of projects, combined with 
community monitoring and a clear line to local leaders, would drive 
accountability and promote greater success in the revenue-sharing program. 
While some scholars have questioned the value of transparency,164 it seemed 
to us at the outset that many of the critiques did not directly apply to the 
setting of our study. In particular, the transparency was directed directly at 
ordinary people rather than elites, it was not costly for the implementing 
agency, and the information provided through transparency directly linked 
to institutions that might solve problems, namely by fostering direct 
complaints to the head administrative officer of local governments. Yet still, 
we observed failed projects and evidence of mismanagement in as many of 
the treatment villages as control villages. This result might mean that the 
limits of transparency go beyond even what the critics of transparency have 
identified. 
We returned to the field determined to find information to explain these 
surprising results. As part of this field work, we conducted a series of 
interviews with officials involved in implementing the local development 
projects. We interviewed twenty-one individuals, all from different regions 
surrounding the Park—three people in each of six positions, including 
officials at the district, subcounty, and village levels.165 Interviewees 
included each of the district chief administrative officers who had received 
the treatment reports.166 
We found some evidence that our treatment made an impact in ways 
that we were unable to measure. We found that the transparency provided—
particularly information about what to expect and how to seek recourse in 
the event of mismanagement or corruption—was credited on several 
occasions with enabling citizens to push back against corruption and seek 
redress from officials in ways that we did not anticipate. While these claims 
for accountability did not result in better or more completed projects, we 
uncovered three instances that helped us better see the impact of the 
 
 164 See supra Section I.C. 
 165 Buntaine & Daniels, Diffuse Responsibility Undermines Public Oversight, supra note 31, at 4. 
 166 While interview transcripts are on file with the authors, due to concerns relating to protecting the 
identities of the interviewees—a core tenet of research ethics—they remain unavailable to those outside 
the study. 
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transparency messages. Here are the examples we found,167 each of them 
corroborated by more than one of our interviewees: 
In one treatment village, people received our messages about how much 
money would be spent procuring the goats for an animal rearing project. A 
subcounty chief came to the village and offered villagers cash instead of 
goats, telling the residents that the goats were sick. Funds had been provided 
to spend a certain amount on each goat, but the subcounty chief told the 
village that they would receive a fifth of what was allocated. Some villagers 
accepted the money, and others did not, receiving no compensation.168 
Based on the discrepancy between the information the villagers 
received from the transparency treatment and what they were told by the 
subcounty chief, some of the villagers decided to issue a complaint to the 
Park. The Park, in turn, directed them to the district chief administrative 
officer. The district investigated the incident, and upon finding the subcounty 
chief had misused funds, the district attempted to fire him. The subcounty 
chief successfully challenged the decision to fire him in an administrative 
review, and he was reinstated after having been suspended for a number of 
months. The district ended up transferring this subcounty chief to a location 
where he would not oversee projects funded by the Park.169 
In a second treatment village, villagers were told that they would 
receive a certain amount of money for their local development project as part 
of transparency messages. The subcounty chief told the village they would 
only receive two-thirds of what they were told they would receive. Because 
of the transparency messages, the villagers knew to expect more money and 
asked about the remaining funds. While never substantiated, it was suspected 
that the subcounty chief had arranged a scheme to pocket some of the 
additional funds. The villagers reached out to the Park to ask if their project 
had been changed. After being informed that it had not, the villagers brought 
this to the local government’s attention and the district fired the subcounty 
chief. The local development project was eventually completed, though not 
within the timeline measured in our experiment.170 
In a third treatment village, villagers were told that the Park had 
approved a particular development project as part of the transparency 
treatment. The subcounty chief released funds for a contractor to pursue a 
different project. When work on a different project began, villagers 
 
 167 Buntaine & Daniels, Diffuse Responsibility Undermines Public Oversight, supra note 31, at 27–
31. 
 168 Id. at 27. 
 169 Id. at 28. 
 170 Id. at 29. 
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complained to the subcounty. The subcounty chief told the villagers that 
there was not a problem.171 The villagers complained to the Park, which 
directed them to complain to the district chief administrative officer. The 
district auditor initiated a review, which found that the subcounty had 
released substantial sums to the contractor for work he had finished on the 
alternative project along with additional payments for phases of work that 
had not been started, which is not permitted by procurement rules. The 
district ordered the subcounty chief to fix the problem, and the contractor 
ultimately fled the subcounty, leaving the alternative project unfinished.172 
While we were not able to measure these kinds of effects of 
transparency in our randomized controlled trials, each of these narratives is 
in accord with our theory. We had hoped that pressure from the community 
on the district chief administrative officer would help prompt that official to 
see that he or she had a specific duty to investigate problems within his or 
her area of oversight. As we hypothesized, when a more specific duty was 
triggered, the chief administrative officer acted. In two of the three cases we 
identified, it did not improve outcomes of specific development projects. In 
one village, the community only received a portion of its funding to purchase 
livestock, though its efforts to draw attention to problems resulted in a 
subcounty chief losing his job. A second village ended up with a partially 
completed project that was different than the one the Park had funded, 
though due to its efforts the corrupt contractor who caused them problems 
fled the subcounty in an apparent attempt to avoid punishment. In a third 
village, misallocated funds were eventually returned to a village—though 
not in time for us to capture this in our endline surveys (though regardless, 
one case would not have changed our results much). This case also resulted 
in the termination of a subcounty chief. 
A second development that surprised us was that during our structured 
interviews with district chief administrative officers,173 each of those 
interviewed claimed to have never read or even seen the reports we had 
created and that the Park’s chief warden had delivered. These reports 
summarized the progress of projects in each of the villages on a biweekly 
basis and were meant to aid the district’s oversight of local development 
projects by identifying specific problems.174 These reports were consistently 
delivered by Park rangers with a cover letter from the chief warden of the 
Park. The chief warden had also reached out to the district chief 
 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 30. 
 173 Id. at 22. 
 174 Id. at 22, 24. 
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administrative officers, stressing his concern with the report’s findings and 
asking whether he could answer any questions about the report.175 
Our counterparts at the Park had a hard time believing that the reports 
were not reviewed. Another potential explanation is that the district chief 
administrative officer’s purported disinterest was a form of obfuscation. We 
discuss this possibility at greater length in Part VI, but claiming not to have 
seen the reports is also consistent with how one would expect a public 
official with a diffuse oversight duty to react if he or she wanted to refute 
evidence of specific knowledge of a problem—knowledge which might 
prompt a duty to act. Obfuscation of knowledge and responsibility goes hand 
in hand with blame shifting, which became a recurring theme; officials 
consistently assigned responsibility for failure on other individuals and 
offices. 
Blame shifting was, in fact, a central element in the interviews we 
conducted. In addition to the previously-mentioned interviews with the 
district chief administrative officers, we also conducted interviews with eight 
village leaders and committee members and eight subcounty officials. In 
these interviews, we asked each individual where corruption had arisen or 
was likely to occur in the process of implementing local development 
projects, as money flowed from Uganda Wildlife Authority to the districts, 
then to the subcounties, and was finally paid to the contractors. Each 
participant pointed at other players. Elected officials at the subcounty blamed 
corrupt appointed subcounty chiefs; subcounty chiefs pointed to corrupt 
contractors and local villagers sitting on village committees; village 
chairpersons blamed both subcounty and district governments for opacity; 
and members of village committees pointed to the subcounty.176 In Figure 6, 
we illustrate the range of answers we received in our interviews. 
To analyze the interviews, we created a coding scheme for 
systematically categorizing the blame each actor placed on different layers 
of government. Four people not involved in conducting or transcribing the 
interviews were provided our coding instructions and independently coded 
each interview. Coders were asked to identify instances of blame which 
interviewees placed on the problems found in the implementation of the 
Park’s local development project to others involved in implementation 
(officials at the village, subcounty, or district levels of government, a 
contractor, or the Park itself). The coders were asked to assign a score of 1 
(meaning “a low level of blame,” such as speculation of corruption or general 
statements of likely sources of corruption, without directly implicating 
 
 175 Id. at 11. 
 176 See id. at 34. 
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anyone) or 2 (meaning “a high level of blame,” such as a direct accusation 
of corruption or suspected corruption), with an implicit score of 0 (meaning 
“no blame”). In instances where an individual placed blame on multiple 
officials at the same level of government, the highest blame score was 
selected for that level of government. 
We found our coders very frequently came to agreement. Not only did 
the coders almost uniformly agree as to when interviewees blamed others, 
but also in more than 85% of the scores, at least three out of the four coders 
assigned the same blame score to the interview. We took the coding scores 
and then averaged between the four different encodings and interviewees’ 
roles to find the average blame individuals in each role placed on the 
different levels of government. We present these results graphically in Figure 
6. 
These interviews with officials at the subcounty and village levels 
reveal a more general trend among actors to blame corruption and 
mismanagement on others and shift the accountability for poor outcomes 
away from themselves. In some cases, blame was placed on another level of 
government; in others, interviewees pointed to specific officials’ actions (or, 
in some cases, inaction). 
This blame shifting is a particularly serious problem when paired with 
the difficulties villagers faced in demanding accountability from local 
officials. In each of the three cases we outlined above, where villagers were 
able to seek accountability, they were passed from one authority to the next 
multiple times before they were able to successfully air their concerns. This 
failure of any level of government to take responsibility for the revenue-
sharing program’s successful implementation was a serious barrier to 
achieving better results. The difficulty local governments face in auditing the 
delivery of projects would make achieving accountability difficult under the 
best of circumstances. When coupled with a web of officials who can each 
pass off responsibility, accountability through transparency becomes 
hopelessly difficult to attain. 
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FIGURE 6 
 Note: Showing who blamed whom for revenue-sharing problems in interviews with subcounty and 
village officials. Interviews with district officials were not included in this analysis. Thicker arrows 
indicate a higher average degree of blame placed on the recipient. Blame was scored from 0–2, with 0 
corresponding to no blame and 2 being a direct accusation of corruption or suspected corruption. Blame 
scores were then averaged over individuals in each office. District, village, and subcounty governments 
refer to blame that was placed on the level of government as a whole or on individual officials at that 
level. Individuals interviewed include village LC 1 Chairpersons (LC 1), members of the village-level 
project management and project procurement committees (PMC / PPC), subcounty chiefs (SC Chief), 
and subcounty LC 3 chairpersons (LC 3). 
As mentioned in Part III, we also sought to rule out the possibility that 
we did not find an effect of the transparency treatments in either phase of 
this research project because the information spilled over between villages, 
contaminating the control group. To do so, we examined the interaction 
between the treatment and the number of contiguous villages. If the treatment 
effects were modified by contiguous villages, we would see confidence 
intervals on the interaction terms that did not include zero and main effects 
on the treatment that differed from what was reported above. We did not find 
consistent evidence that the effect of treatment is conditional on whether 
nearby villages are also treated.177 
 
 
 177 See infra Tables 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 3: TREATMENT EFFECTS FOR PARTICIPATION OUTCOMES CONSIDERING SPILLOVER 
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TABLE 4: TREATMENT EFFECTS FOR VILLAGE-LEVEL ACCOUNTABILITY OUTCOMES 
CONSIDERING SPILLOVER 
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*          *          * 
We set out to test transparency in a setting where other institutions of civil 
society were still developing and sometimes effectively absent. In this 
context, we wanted to address important assertions made about transparency. 
Does transparency reduce corruption and improve governance? Does it 
mobilize the public? While scholars, government officials, and aid 
organizations put great stock in transparency, there is seldom an opportunity 
to test that faith. 
We found little positive evidence that transparency accomplishes any 
of the goals people assume, based on the measures we were able to analyze 
statistically. Transparency did not mobilize citizens to be more involved in 
governance and it may have even demobilized less empowered groups, such 
as women facing well-defined gender roles that expect women to defer to 
men.178 Only when messages with information reached many people did we 
see indications of a positive effect on participation. Likewise, transparency 
did not lead to better implementation of development projects, though it 
seems that it did cost at least some corrupt officials their jobs. 
Often in law review articles, the last section is designed to answer the 
question of “So what?” We believe the better question, given our results, is 
“Now what?” 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND EXPLORATIONS: NOW WHAT? 
We are quick to concede that our experiment is not the final word on 
the two examined transparency hypotheses. Our observations were made in 
one location, in one country, at one moment in time, and do not necessarily 
apply to transparency initiatives worldwide. At the same time, we also 
recognize that our experiment was first of its kind. We were given a rare 
opportunity to test transparency in this way, particularly in the setting of a 
developing country where corruption was expected to be a major hurdle. 
Given our experience and findings, we now provide a description of 
how the last four years of working on this project has changed the way we 
think about transparency. The discussion below is not as much the social 
science implications of our findings, but rather a rendition of how our 
thinking has evolved on the broader questions relating to transparency, 
particularly transparency initiatives in developing democracies with 
struggling institutions. 
 
 178 See infra notes 188–190 and accompanying text. 
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A. Should We Just Give Up on Transparency? 
We had a chance to test transparency in a place where the stakes are 
high.179 Transparency could in theory help to accelerate political 
development when other features of well-functioning democracy, such as a 
vibrant press and active civic associations, are less established. We tested 
transparency in such an environment, and it did not fare well. In fact, in some 
respects, it may have even backfired.180 We did not expect this result; 
consistent with the great thrust of transparency theory, we hypothesized 
transparency would have a number of positive effects.181 
Even as we have been left scratching our heads at times about the results 
of our transparency tests, we note that many of our partners in Uganda 
continue to see great value in the transparency interventions we tested. Our 
partners in the Park tell us that everywhere they go, people say good things 
about the messages and the opportunity to receive new types of information. 
They are very determined not only to continue working with us, but even to 
highlight our work when dealing with their peers, such as other Park 
managers. 
Additionally, despite the results of our experiments, a number of our 
personal experiences suggest that we should not yet give up on transparency. 
As our work began, we were met with hope-filled faces of the residents who 
lined up to sign up to receive the transparency messages. Even as the 
platform we established sent a barrage of messages to thousands of people 
week after week, very few opted out of receiving messages, which they could 
have done by sending a single “STOP” reply. Those few who did opt out 
greatly outnumbered those who found out about the opportunities to receive 
transparency messages and later asked to join the platform and experience 
some transparency for themselves. While anecdotal, such observations and 
our interactions with residents when visiting villages consistently suggest 
that the platform has been well-received in the community. 
Even during our interviews with the individuals whom we contacted to 
explore why the messages left them feeling shut out from the meetings to 
choose local projects, a number of them took the time to tell us that they 
appreciated the information. Perhaps the strongest evidence came in 
response to open-ended questions about what the Bwindi Information 
Network could do to help revenue sharing and whether there was anything 
our research team should know about participating in revenue sharing; these 
 
 179 See supra Section I.B.2 (discussing the reasons why the assertions about effects of transparency 
are much less certain in developing democracies as opposed to developed democracies where institutions 
and civil society are in comparison much more robust). 
 180 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 181 See supra Part III. 
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questions contrast with other prompts that directly asked about the 
performance of the platform. We said in their recorded prompts, for example, 
“You can always send me updates on my phone especially what [the Park] 
is planning for people who live in frontline villages.” Another respondent 
told us, “You are doing very well, keep it up.” Yet another said, “We like 
your messages, especially those ones that talk about conservation of the 
Park.” 
We may not have figured out how to harness this excitement for 
transparency (or perhaps even how to measure it), but we observed an 
intangible spark that seems to suggest transparency is having an impact. Our 
results suggest, however, that transparency is unlikely to be a quick fix to the 
problems of effective governance. 
In our presentations and reviews about our work, we have received 
many questions about why transparency did not have a measurable effect in 
our experiment. Indeed, it is interesting to probe why so many people have 
asked that question. Many have an instinctual, almost implicit trust in 
transparency. For those with such confidence in transparency, our results are 
challenging. 
Yet, our results are also hopeful. Even though we could not measure the 
impacts of our accountability measures, in qualitative results we found that 
those who received the transparency treatment used the information to 
demand accountability and, to some extent, succeeded in doing so.182 There 
is also a possibility that the administrators at the Park are right—the timeline 
for transparency to work may be beyond the timeline of our research 
projects. 
B. It’s Grease, Not a Disinfectant 
Our experiments suggest important limits of the effectiveness of 
transparency in developing democracies. The alluring benefits promised by 
transparency advocates—that it can serve as a disinfectant, a key to 
participation, and a booster to the perceptions of citizens about 
government—cannot operate in a vacuum. Transparency’s effectiveness 
relies on other functioning aspects of democratic institutions. 
While Justice Brandeis associated transparency with the disinfecting 
power of sunlight, we have instead come to see transparency as grease on the 
gears of democracy. If that same grease is applied to a poorly designed 
machine—a machine whose parts do not fit as well together, which has 
missing pieces or parts installed improperly—the grease does little and may 
 
 182 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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in fact just make a mess. It is not transparency itself that will constrain 
corrupt actors and bring about more effective government. Other institutions 
and aspects of civil society must be strong enough to support those goals.183 
To help the machine of developing democracies, more thought should 
be given to the role of transparency as democracies mature. As mentioned in 
Part II, for most of the world’s developed democracies, robust transparency 
entered into the mix of good government initiatives quite late in the process 
of political and economic development. Does this mean that developing 
democracies should hold off? No, but our experiments suggest that care 
ought to be taken to prioritize other aspects of political development above 
transparency. 
The failure of transparency to create measurable effects in our 
experiment might be explained, in large part, by the weaknesses of the 
machinery of democracy in our research setting, coupled with the external 
stresses that same machinery constantly faces. Take the accountability 
hypothesis: each of the steps embedded in the assumption that transparency 
will result in accountability are potential stumbling blocks. And, in a 
developing democracy, these stumbling blocks are larger than they would be 
in the context of developed democracy. We begin with the assumption that 
specific knowledge about mismanagement would trigger an oversight duty 
to prevent the mismanagement. Our conversations with district chief 
administrative officers suggest that they took seriously the duty to keep 
books that could withstand a potential audit but that they did not think about 
their oversight function more broadly. This might be a function of 
 
 183 This is something other commentators of transparency regimes in other developing democracies 
have noted. Aude Delescluse, Chad-Cameroon: A Model Pipeline?, 5 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 43 (2004) 
(arguing that transparency cannot fix poor governance or function well without strong civil society); Alex 
Kardon, Response: Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: Implications of the 
Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 59, 59 (2008) (“While 
there is persuasive evidence that low government accountability is at the heart of the resource curse, the 
link between this claim and identifying transparency as the best solution is tenuous. Achieving 
transparency may not cure the curse where civil society is not strong enough to convert information into 
accountability.”); id. at 63 (asserting that transparency “will be fruitless if civil society is not prepared to 
do its part”); Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin, Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency 
Effective in Reducing Corruption, 31 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 301, 316 (2010); Irma E. Sandoval-
Ballesteros, Rethinking Accountability and Transparency: Breaking the Public Sector Bias in Mexico, 
29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 439 (2014) (“Today’s political struggle for public access to information is 
as important as past struggles for political, civil, and social rights. Mexico is still unfortunately far from 
successfully constructing a conscious and organized social force. The groups that exist in civil society are 
scarce and the agenda of transparency has failed to permeate the thoughts and actions of citizens. 
Mexico’s persistent struggle is to develop a system of institutional, organizational, social, and political 
checks and balances that shift the priority of government institutions to public good instead of personal 
gain. This is perhaps the greatest challenge to transparency in Mexico’s near future.”). 
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bookkeeping made salient because it is monitored closely by Uganda’s 
Office of the Auditor General, but there might be more to it, as well. Perhaps 
when civil society so rarely manages to sound the alarm about specific 
problems, officials with oversight duties are not trained to listen for and 
recognize citizens’ concerns. 
And, even when the alarms sound and are heard due to transparency, 
these concerns might be drowned out by other stresses on the system. Our 
reports sat on desks with other reports and matters that presented what might 
seem to be insurmountable problems. Local residents around the Park suffer 
from chronic poverty.184 Many families cannot afford to pay school fees.185 
AIDS is a major problem in these local communities,186 and the Ebola 
outbreak ravaged communities that border this area of Uganda.187 And while 
our report might highlight instances of mismanagement and corruption, there 
are reasons to worry that these problems are much more widespread than the 
cases we have identified. Spotlighting a problem does not create a solution, 
especially when there are more pressing matters at hand. 
One of the messes created by the grease of transparency in our 
experiment was the demobilization of women, and by extension other 
disadvantaged groups, when transparency highlighted real or perceived local 
elite capture.188 This is not an easy problem to unwind. In fact, the coalition 
that has created local elite capture almost certainly has a stranglehold on far 
more government decision-making than just the planning of local 
development projects. Men’s voices tend to dominate so much of life in these 
villages, and messages that devalue the potential contributions of women 
 
 184 See Robert Bitariho et al., Tangible Benefits or Token Gestures: Does Bwindi Impenetrable 
National Park’s Long Established Multiple Use Programme Benefit the Poor?, 25 FORESTS, TREES & 
LIVELIHOODS 16, 16–18 (2016); Ann A. Laudati, The Encroaching Forest: Struggles Over Land and 
Resources on the Boundary of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda, 23 SOC’Y & NAT. 
RESOURCES 776, 779 (2010); David Mwesigye Tumusiime & Espen Sjaastad, Conservation and 
Development: Justice, Inequality, and Attitudes Around Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, 50 J. DEV. 
STUD. 204, 208 (2014). 
 185 See DORIEN KORBEE, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN BWINDI: A FOCUS ON FARMERS 17 (2007), 
http://www.envirosecurity.org/espa/PDF/Environmental_Security_in_Bwindi.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XHW4-CTSD]; MICHELLE WIELAND & ROBERT BITARIHO, A LOCAL ASSESSMENT OF 
THE IMPACTS OF FIFTEEN YEARS OF BMCT INTERVENTIONS 29 (2013), 
http://itfc.must.ac.ug/sites/default/files/2018-07/BMCT%20Assessment%20Report_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PX57-JHAZ]. 
 186 See Masinde, supra note 114. 
 187 See Amanda Lichtenstein & Rosebell Kagumire, DRC Ebola Outbreak Spreads to Neighboring 
Uganda, Activating Rapid Preparedness Response, GLOBAL VOICES (June 13, 2019, 1:10 PM), 
https://globalvoices.org/2019/06/13/drc-ebola-outbreak-spreads-to-neighboring-uganda-activating-
rapid-preparedness-response/ [https://perma.cc/Z7N2-M46D]. 
 188 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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have been a part of life for most since they were young.189 And, even putting 
aside gender power imbalances, thwarting the local power brokers in a local 
planning meeting might come at serious personal cost. In communities as 
small as these villages (on average 200–400 households each), getting on the 
wrong side of those in power might cause interpersonal problems in many 
other facets of life. 
The Park seems particularly motivated to address this issue because in 
the villages surrounding the Park women are much more likely than men to 
interact with the forest. Within family structures, women often take on the 
tasks of gathering wood, working farms at the edge of the forest, and fetching 
water. From the perspective of Park leadership, there is a great need for, and 
interest in, creating specific safeguards to better include women in the 
process of selecting and planning for local development projects funded by 
the Park. But how to fulfill that need? This is one of the most difficult 
challenges our experiment uncovered, and one that warrants careful and 
thorough examination, beyond what is feasible in the confines of this 
paper.190 
Just as we saw the effects of transparency dampened by blame shifting 
and obfuscation, we also saw the grease of transparency do its work in ways 
that our quantitative survey and audit protocols could not measure. When we 
went out into the field to determine why the accountability treatment did not 
result in the expected gains, we wanted to understand what went wrong. But 
we realized that one crucial question we had failed to ask was, “What went 
right?” True, we found out that the district chief administrative officers did 
not use our reports, but we also found that those same officials took 
meaningful actions to provide oversight when complaints from residents 
came to them. Furthermore, we learned that these complaints were a result 
of our transparency treatments. It became difficult for us to continue in our 
belief that our experiments did not have any effect (as our statistical analyses 
suggested) when we learned of a subcounty chief who was fired, another 
who was disciplined and transferred, and a contractor who had to flee in 
order to escape legal consequences. At the very least, these three people 
would take issue with the conclusion that the transparency treatment had no 
effect. 
 
 189 See supra Section IV.A. See generally Peter R. Atekyereza, The Education of Girls and Women 
in Uganda, 16 J. SOC. DEV. AFR. 115 (2001) (examining the particular struggles women face in securing 
an education in Uganda). 
 190 This problem is not unique to Uganda; it persists across many societies. See, e.g., Jessica Gottlieb, 
Why Might Information Exacerbate the Gender Gap in Civic Participation? Evidence from Mali, 
86 WORLD DEV. 95, 95–98, 101–05 (2016); I.S.R. Pape, “This Is Not a Meeting for Women” The 
Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women’s Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes, 35 LATIN AM. 
PERSP. 41, 43–58 (2008). 
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Just as blame shifting and obfuscation were difficult to measure 
effectively, it was also difficult to observe when individuals had taken 
evidence from the transparency initiative and used it to make their case to 
decision-makers. The work of these individuals helped root out officials and 
contractors who had misused funds the Park provided for local development 
projects. The transparency treatments helped to create movement toward 
accountable government in unexpected ways that are difficult to detect 
through general and quantitative measures. And, it is possible that this kind 
of transparency, having driven government to fulfill some of its 
accountability functions, may remind those in the system to expect more. It 
may even inspire people to use other institutions and elements of civil society 
to seek accountability from government. 
To the extent that our experiments have left those with any influence 
over the fate of transparency initiatives wondering about the value of 
transparency, we would caution against giving up too easily. Yes, we would 
advocate that transparency initiatives be developed with care, to maximize 
transparency’s potential benefits and to minimize its risks. And we recognize 
that there may be complex dynamics in play, the effects of which cannot be 
foreseen at the outset, nor effectively measured at the backend. Understand 
that transparency has limits: it cannot solve problems of weak institutions 
and endemic failures of good governance. Ultimately, transparency is not by 
itself a disinfectant, as originally proposed, nor is it machinery—rather 
transparency is merely the grease for the gears of democracy. However, we 
recognize that transparency may still inspire people to care for the 
machinery. Investments in transparency must be carefully weighed against 
other opportunities to help build the other vital institutions and features of 
well-functioning democracies. 
C. Looking Forward 
Corruption in government is a very hard problem to solve.191 In 
retrospect, we question whether a single-shot intervention like a boost to 
transparency could ever be enough to generate a measurable impact. The 
expectations people have about government are not created overnight, and 
neither is trust. Particularly in developing democracies, where government 
dysfunction is common and where corruption may even be considered 
routine, motivating people to take action is difficult. Action against 
corruption exposes individuals to significant risks, which range from wasted 
time at best, to retribution from officials who resent meddling at worst. 
Indeed, one of the reasons we settled on crowd-sourcing reports of 
 
 191 See supra Part II. 
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implementation problems was to shield our subject pool from some of the 
risks of retribution. 
The time scale of our research and the time scale for institutional change 
might not align. It may well be that people need a longer dose of transparency 
treatment before significant results can be observed. The feedback we 
received from our partners at the Park indicated they believe that they were 
seeing changes, including officials being put on notice or removed from 
office, even if we did not observe significant effects in our survey and audit 
data. But sufficiently subtle shifts may not be detectable using accepted 
statistical methods, given the limited number of villages surrounding the 
Park. 
We will continue to help the Park provide transparency for certain sorts 
of information, such as information about what projects the Park has funded, 
when it transfers money, how much, and to what government entity. Given 
some of the potential limitations of transparency, however, it is no longer the 
current focus of our research. 
Rather, we have moved on to test approaches to improve governance 
surrounding the planning and implementation of local development projects. 
Instead of highlighting problems to local officials, messages will instead 
publicize successes of local officials. Can recognizing excellence promote 
effective implementation better than exposing mismanagement and 
corruption? One feature that has struck us as particularly promising about 
this new approach is that recognizing good governance might catch on even 
in places reticent or unable to provide transparency. Can we move the needle 
by celebrating officials and communities that show excellence? Can the 
recognition carrot deliver results where the transparency stick failed? We 
hope our future research will address these questions. 
CONCLUSION 
If transparency is not the best first step, what is? Answering that 
question is beyond the scope of our research, but the apparent ease of 
exporting transparency to developing democracies should not make it the 
automatic first choice of would-be reformers. However, there is something 
to be said for ease of implementation, especially since anecdotal evidence 
suggested transparency had some effect within the time scale of our study, 
even if these impacts were not detected in our quantitative measurements. 
Transparency should not be abandoned as an element of packages to 
strengthen developing democracies, but expectations about its effects in 
isolation should be appropriately managed. Thinking about the context of 
transparency and the potential costs and benefits of transparency is 
warranted—at least some dose of transparency skepticism seems warranted. 
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But, there is something more here—something not fully captured in our 
data. Why have we seen people running from far-away houses to line up and 
sign up to join the information platform and to receive information from the 
Park? Why are Park officials so excited about transparency despite the 
discouraging results of our research? We see it as a great source of hope that 
our partners at the Park have tried to kick-start change. We find the same 
hope in the many people in the communities with whom we have worked 
who clearly long for change. This is the hope that has animated us from the 
beginning of our work in Bwindi. 
While the transparency experiments did not turn out the way anyone 
involved hoped or expected, our tests were not the final say in successfully 
promoting effective government in developing democracies. Ultimately, we 
maintain hope that success will arise from many well-intentioned, dedicated 
citizens and officials, working together to fight corruption and invest energy 
in building up effective governments and institutions, even in the face of 
change coming at a much slower pace than any of the stakeholders would 
like. It is also impossible to rule out that transparency is a necessary 
condition to fix the sorts of problems the Park faces, even if in the short term 
it is not sufficient. Still, while our research suggests caution, our on-the-
ground experience tells us to try again, but to work smarter, building on the 
lessons we have learned alongside our partners. We still believe that they are 
up to the challenge. 
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